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REBUILDING THE PuBLIC-PRIVATE CITY: REGULATORY
TAKING'S ANTI-SUBORDINATION INSIGHTS FOR
EMINENT DOMAIN AND REDEVELOPMENT

AUDREY G. McFARLANE'

ABSTRACf

The eminent domain debate, steeped in the language of property rights,
currently lacks language and conceptual space to address what is really
at issue in today' s cities: complex, fundamental disagreements between
market and community about development. The core doctrinal issue
presented by development is how can we acknowledge the subordination
of citizens who happen to live in areas that are attractive to wealthier
citizens. In particular, how should we address the political process
failure reflected in the privatized methods of decisionmaking that typify
redevelopment? The conceptual language and analytical construct for
appropriately addressing these issues come from critical race theory and
its project of anti-subordination. The doctrinal model for resolving
urban development disagreement comes from the anti-subordination
principles reflected in regulatory takings doctrine. This Article argues
that regulatory takings doctrine reflects one of the most developed, yet
underappreciated, anti-subordination doctrines in the law. Both takings
and critical race theory provide a template for properly focusing on ways
to improve the lack of public accountability in development and the
unresponsiveness of eminent domain doctrine to commonly accepted
notions of fairness as a component of the public good.

"They don't know I got a[n] [eminent domain] clause of my own . ...
They can carry me out feet first . .. but my clause say . .. they got to
meet my price!'"
-Memphis Lee, Two Trains Running

* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. This Article was made
possible by the generous research support of the University of Baltimore Law School. Thanks to
Ray Dubicki and Oyinade Koya for able research assistance. Additionally, thank you to the
following people who generously read earlier drafts and offered comments: Michele Alexandre,
Taunya Banks, Patience Crowder, Gerald Frug, Cassandra Jones Havard, Odeana Neal, Catherine
Smith, Terry Smith, John V. White.
l. AUGUST WILSON, Two TRAINs RUNNING act I, sc. 3 (1992) (statement of "greasy spoon"
proprietor Memphis Lee). See Frank Rich, Two Trains Running; August Wilson Reaches the 60's
With Witnesses From a Distance, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 14, 1992, at C13 (Lee who "is negotiating a
price for the city's demolition of his restaurant, is confident he can beat the white man at his own
game as long as he knows the rules").
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INTRODUCTION

With the failed challenge to the exercise of eminent domain in Kelo v. City
of New London,2 the state of eminent domain constitutional doctrine continues
to be highly deferential to states and local government. For some reason, the
popular objection to the sanction of economic development as an acceptable
constitutional justification did not translate within the confines of eminent
domain jurisprudence. The unresponsiveness of federal constitutional doctrine
might be due to the ways that the challenge is typically framed. Objections are
framed in highly individualized terms as issues of private property rights,
discussed entirely along the axis of the public/private distinction. 3 These
public/private arguments demanded that the Court attempt to draw what would
likely be un administrable hard lines between valid and invalid purposes.
The overall eminent domain debate pits two types of concerns against each
other in a dialogue that speaks past the other in different languages. At the core
of the opposition are earnest and deeply held beliefs about individual property
rights: claims to reliance and expectation interests that must be protected against
governmental decisions. These emotionally charged arguments typically reflect
outrage over the perceived violation of fundamental guarantees of free choice,
control over unwanted change, and against uncertainty.4 Powerlessness in the
face of change is part of the human condition, but legal doctrinal powerlessness
in the face of human-initiated change is profoundly different; it suggests a
frustrating lack of agency in the face of unfair governmental decisionmaking,
which has the legitimizing imprimatur of democracy.

2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

3. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The PubliC/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on
Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 363-64 (1993) (evaluating the criticism of the publicprivate distinction that "state action ... [is] ubiquitous" in a system oflaws); Gerald Turkel, The
PubliC/Private Distinction: Approaches to the Critique of Legal Ideology, 22 LAW & SOC'y REv.
801, 812-13 (1988) (arguing that treating the public-private distinction as a relative concept saves
it from incoherency by a continuum of images "ultimately, rooted in imagery from the past: 'The
distinction is dead, but it rules us from the grave. "'); Joan Williams, The Development of the
PubliC/Private Distinction in American Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 225, 226 (1985) (book review)
("Doctrines that incorporate the public/private distinction include the principles that localities may
issue bonds only for 'public purposes' and may be sued for torts committed in their private
(proprietary) but not their public (governmental) capacity; that the government may take land in
eminent domain only for 'public uses."') (citations omitted).
4. See Kristi M. Burkard, No More Government Theft of Property! A Call to Return to a
Heightened Standard of Review After the United States Supreme Coun Decision in Kelo v. City
of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'y 115 (2005); Gideon Kanner, The Public Use
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Honatory Fluff"?, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 335 (2006); Brent
Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose: The Supreme Coun Stretches
the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GoNZ.L. REv. 81 (2005); Sonya D. Jones,
Note, That Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land . .. Until the Local Government Can Tum
Itfor a Profit: A Critical Analysis ofKelo v. City of New London, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 139 (2005).
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Arguments by urban development proponents of eminent domain are rational
in defense of the need for both growth and change to reverse or avert urban
decline. 5 At the core of these arguments is a communitarian-like defense of the
need for eminent domain: use "change" as a route to progress and urban
economic health. 6 That such change and growth may come at the expense of a
few is a price worth paying in order to protect and promote the interests of the
general good of the local polity.
Currently, there is no conceptual space or language in this property versus
community debate to meaningfully acknowledge and address what is really at
issue in today' s cities: complex, fundamental disagreements between market and
community about development, economic growth, prosperity, and communal
needs. The overarching question fueling the eminent domain issue is, can, and
should, legal doctrine address the structural shift and current biases of the global
economy? Market demand, fueled by globalization, weighs the interests of
wealth more than the disaggregated claims of property rights presented by
residents (either tenants or owners). This results in types, locations, and methods
of development that are subordinating. An unanswered economic question about
eminent domain is how the globalized economy affects or controls local
government's need to work to further local economic development. Are there so
few choices left after globalization that the current approaches to economic
development are inevitable?7
Doctrinally, the specific issue is how to address the subordination of citizens
who happen to live in areas that are now attractive to wealthier citizens. We have
not grappled with subordination resulting from the state and local political
process.
This subordination is reflected in the privatized method of
decisionmaking that typifies redevelopment. Redevelopment's improvements
most often come at the expense of a consistent few types of persons: poor,
working class people; however, there is an increasing effect on middle-class
residents.
The conceptual language and analytical construct for addressing these issues
come from critical race theory. Race, class, and wealth have long been at the

5. See, e.g., Brief for the American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166929;
Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good Newsfor Local Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 803 (2006); Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very
Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 455 (2007);
Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private Economic Redevelopment,
34 EcoWGY L.Q. I (2007).
6. See Cole, supra note 5, at 824 (noting that main supporters of the eminent domain power
are "local government groups, such as the National League of Cities, city planners, and
developers").
7. A growing body of literature suggests that globalization need not have taken either the
shape or the pace that it has in the United States. See, e.g., William Sites, Primitive Globalization?
State and Locale in Neoliberal Global Engagement, 18 Soc. THEORY 121, 125 (2000) (arguing that
different nations understand and have responded to globalization differently).
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heart of the claim against eminent domain. The debate over eminent domain is
inadequately acknowledged as a geographically and racially identified debate
over development now being fueled by globalization. Prior to Kelo v. City of
New London,s eminent domain and redevelopment was largely a Black and urban
phenomenon. The introductory epigraph quotes Memphis Lee, a character in an
August Wilson play, and illustrates that eminent domain and redevelopment have
been such a part of the Black American experience that it makes an appropriate
plot. The perceived need to improve dilapidated, underserved, economically
disconnected communities has been primarily located in poor or working-class,
Black neighborhoods in the inner city. As demonstrated by the massive
disruptions of community resulting from poorly conceived and poorly executed
redevelopment schemes during the urban renewal era, the oppression of the
"blight" designation predates Kelo, yet has long been accepted as part of the
normal terrain of the urban landscape. Kelo, however, geographically decoupled
eminent domain from the inner city and made clear that the power could
potentially be exercised anywhere, even outside of the Black inner cities. 9 By
clarifying that "economic development" now permits property and communities
to theoretically be taken and remade anywhere, the oppressive aspects of the
broad term "development" is now receiving long overdue attention. 10
The purpose of this Article is to bridge the language gap in the eminent
domain discourse by translating the property rights language into the antisubordination language of critical race theory. The best legal doctrinal model for
resolving these urban development disagreements comes from the suburbs, 11
from the anti-subordination principles reflected in regulatory takings doctrine. 12

8. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
9. This point was presaged by Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242
(1984), where the eminent domain context was outside the inner city and focused on remedying a
problem of oligopoly and concentration of land ownership.
10. The perception that the doctrine has shifted geographically has led to an alliance between
otherwise strange bedfellows. Conservative property rights groups, small business owners,
communitarians, and the NAACP have all united to oppose eminent domain. See Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1412,1418 (2006)
('The case united, if only for a short while, such unlikely allies as the Institute for Justice, the
NAACP, Richard Epstein, and Amitai Etzioni, all of whom opposed the planned taking.")
(footnotes omitted).
11. Regulatory takings doctrine arises mainly from development controversies in suburban
and rural settings. Though exercises of eminent domain have largely been confined to urban
settings, they are increasingly occurring in inner-ring suburbs. See Wendell E. Prichett, Beyond
Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 895, 914
(2006) (arguing that the Kelo controversy reflects the move of the use of eminent domain to
suburban locations).
12. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002). Although Tahoe-Sierra ostensibly stands for a very deferential standard for local
government, which most experts agree means that the vast majority of takings challenges will fail
under federal constitutional grounds, takings doctrine, nevertheless, illustrates what courts have
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Because regulatory takings doctrine reflects one of the most developed, yet
underappreciated, anti-subordination doctrines in the law, it provides a template
for properly focusing on ways to improve the lack of public accountability and
increase development's responsiveness to commonly accepted notions of public
good. Financially compensated urban eminent domain condemnations and
financially uncompensated exercises of suburban regulatory power (through
moratoria on development or development exactions) involve analogous
discretionary decisionmaking. In regulatory takings doctrine, the Supreme Court
is interested both in individual property rights and in protecting property owners
as a group from the public enterprise of government and the public needs of the
general welfare. 13
The evolution of the ad hoc doctrine of regulatory takings reflects an
imperfect, yet effective, attempt to insulate private property owners from the
structural inequities of the political process. In such cases, the harms to a few,
or to consistently disadvantaged groups that are unable to affect governmental
decisionmaking, suggests a structural compromise of property rights. The
doctrine's evolution includes attempts to harden property rights protections by
intervening to protect property owners on principle. 14 This evolution suggests
that regulatory takings is an anti-subordination doctrine. Thus, regulatory
takings' anti-subordination logic allows us to account for the impact of eminent
domain on property owners as well as on community. It allows us to move past
focusing solely on the problems of the property owners to define the problem.
We shift instead to a definition that encompasses the resident (whether owner or
renter) and the small business person (a commercial resident), as well as the
problems of low-wage workers who want to join in a community either as
resident or laborer.
Part I of this Article discusses the nature of development disagreements in
cities and the problems in both the Kelo majority and dissenting opinions. I
argue that deference to local government in determining public purpose makes
sense, but fails to account for the subordination inherent in much redevelopment.
I also argue that the test advanced by the Kelo dissent, which reflects the
prevailing view in the United States as indicated by the flurry of state eminent
domain legislation and some subsequent state court decisions, 15 is unduly narrow
and unadministrable. The dissent's concern for the impact of eminent domain

found most compelling to protect for property owners. See infra Part II.E.
13. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-26 (1978)
(discussing the important factors in regulatory takings jurisprudence).
14. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (adopting a
categorical rule that a public easement was the equivalent of a permanent physical occupation and
an invalid taking regardless ofthe impact on the market value of the land); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (requiring tenants to receive cable was a taking
because the presence of the cable wire on the property owner's building destroyed the right to
exclude).
15. See David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After
Kelo, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 365, 372-73 (2006).
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approaches, but fails to fully adopt, an anti-subordination logic. I seek to expand
upon these concerns by fully explicating the hidden and not-so-hidden
subordination in redevelopment.
Part II explores Fifth Amendment Takings rationale and its implicit Equal
Protection concerns as ways to doctrinally frame the obligations of government
to refrain from using its powers to subordinate certain citizens. Part II also
discusses the relevance of development disagreements in the suburbs and the
effort to define property rights to protect one's property in the face of great
public desire to preserve nature. I trace the evolution of the reasoning of
regulatory takings doctrine in particular and examine the Court's attentiveness
in scrutinizing the nature of the harm suffered. The imperfect evolution of the
doctrine's attempt to create hard and fast property-based protections against
government decisionmaking has, at the very least, signaled to local governments
that they should tread carefully when imposing anti-development regulation and
individual interests are in conflict with great public need. 16 The principles
derived from regulatory takings suggest a "gut" fairness standard that must be
applicable to disagreements over redevelopment. These disagreements manifest
most often in disputes over the exercise of eminent domain.
Part ill concludes by suggesting how critical race theory's anti-subordination
principles might be applied in the context of a '''carefully considered'
development plan."I? If the plan is to be a validating device for redevelopment,
it must be formulated to ensure some likelihood that it reflects representative
interests within the polity.
I. DEVELOPMENT DISAGREEMENTS IN THE CITY
A. The Supreme Court Majority's Embrace of Rational Deference
1. in the Beginning: Berman v. Parker and Urban Renewal.-The Supreme
Court's eminent domain jurisprudence illustrates the consistent, yet evolving,
nature of disagreements over development in the cities. When the first
redevelopment case of the modem era, Berman v. Parker,18 was decided, the
motive for redevelopment was to offset the beginnings of urban decline by
eliminating slums and redesigning the community according to the modem
planning principles of the time. 19 The petitioners' arguments focused on the

16. See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak:, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court's
Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIsL. REv. 103,116 (2001)
(indicating that "California planners have a high awareness of the [U.S. Supreme Court Takings]
cases").
17. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,478 (2005) (quoting Kelo v. City of New
London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004».
18. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
19. For an extensive discussion of the modernist planning principles and their impact on the
urban renewal era, see Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 699,
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expansion of the redevelopment area beyond acknowledged slum areas and the
insufficiency of the Redevelopment Authority's justifications for the plan.
Petitioners argued their store was not properly characterized as blighted slum
housing because general aesthetics was not a proper public purpose, and the
transfer of the property from the Redevelopment Authority to private real estate
developers was not a public use. 20 These arguments continue to this day to
encompass the core of the arguments against exercises of eminent domain for
economic development. 21 As illustrated by Keith Aoki's work, the development
disagreement of the urban renewal era was the conflict between what was
perceived to be modem and undesirably pre-modern. 22 There was the sense of
an inexorable need to progress and abandon the past in order to properly meet the
future. More concretely, the city foresaw a need to modernize in order to
survive, but residents felt the changes came at their expense. Even though
redevelopment plans were allowed to encompass viable working neighborhoods,
the Berman Court affirmed the propriety of eminent domain used for these
purposes.23 The thought was that scientific excising of diseased or harmful areas
needed to include adjacent unblighted land for a thorough, comprehensive
redesign to prevent worsening conditions. 24 The Court found that this strategy
was necessary and appropriate so long as the government said it was. 25

2. The Difference Between Now and Then: Urban Renewal Versus
Economic Development.-The objections raised in Berman are not dissimilar
from today' s eminent domain objections. The redevelopment scenarios in each
case, although separated by fifty-plus years and labeled differently, are quite
similar. The concern in both New London and Southwest D.C. was, and is, to
reverse decline and keep the cities viable. 26 What has changed about today's

767 (1993).

20. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. Of course, what took place after the decision was drastic, poorly
planned clearance and demolition, not just of slums and dilapidated housing, but of thriving
neighborhood commercial districts and residential areas. Entire communities were displaced
throughout the United States, usually working-class, and Black. This gave urban renewal the bad
name it still carries today. See MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BUllDOZER: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL 1949-1962, at 8-9 (1964); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF
GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 5 (1961); Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban
Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 1,47 (2003).
21. See, e.g., Kelo, 843 A.2d 500 (plaintiffs challenge whether economic development is a
valid public use and whether the taking of plaintiffs' land was reasonably necessary to the
development plan).
22. See Aoki, supra note 19, at 765-73.
23. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 36.
26. See Mihaly, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that "[s]imple ignorance of the transformed and
transforming nature of city-center land use development lies at the heart of the pervasive popular
reaction to the Kelo decision. Americans enjoy the fruits of economic redevelopment .... They
do not, however, understand how the transformation occurred"). Mihaly also argues that the Kelo
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development disagreements, however, is the prevailing view of what needs to be
done to keep cities viable in the twenty-first century. Dramatic changes have
taken place in available types of employment; the opportunity for stable, wellpaid, self-directed work continues to decline.27 The gap continues to widen
between the highly compensated and everyone else. 28 Technology allows for
sudden inflation and deflation of markets, economies, and currency through rapid
global investment and disinvestment. 29 These changes have been heightened by
the United States' relatively rapid entry into liberalized markets and
globalization. 30 Thus, the problem is the same yet different. Adding the global
dimensions of our collective exposure, and the city's exposure, to homogenizing
market forces makes the already high stakes even higher. What is also different
is that the underlying plan supporting the exercise of eminent domain in Kelo was
openly conceived in tandem with, and designed to meet the specific needs of, a
private corporation, Pfizer Pharmaceutical. 3) The Berman question remains but
is perhaps attenuated: what should a city like New London do to address dire
economic conditions? In older, inner-ring suburbs that have lost their economic
and social purpose, what can be done to address the reality of their decline?32
In holding that economic development met the Fifth Amendment standard for
public use by serving a valid public purpose,33 the Kelo majority opinion
carefully navigated a minefield of problems and contradictions. The problems
all concern identifying a principled line that distinguishes proper from improper
takings. In particular, the overt privatization of the development process
produces a great challenge to the underlying public rationale of eminent domain.
In order to provide continued justification for a city's exercise of eminent
domain, the Kelo opinion had to decide between the private impact on resistant
property owners and the public welfare. Although the Court noted the deeply

majority opinion follows Berman, but does not follow its pro-development stance. See id. at 59.
27. See DAVID DOOlEY & JOANN PRAUSE, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF UNDEREMPLOYMENT:
INADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT AS DISGUISED UNEMPLOYMENT 11-14 (2004) (discussing differing
patterns of under-employment for men, women, and minorities).
28. See Saskia Sassen, New Employment Regimes in Cities, in CITIES, ENTERPRISES AND
SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 129, 136 (Frank Moulaert & Allen John Scott eds.,
1997) (noting a dualization in wages in information and knowledge-intensive service industry
wages).
29. See LARRY J. RAY, GLOBAUZATION AND EVERYDAY LIFE 66-67 (2007) (discussing the
networks of trust and cultural practices that support rapid global capital flows).
30. See Sites supra note 7, at 127.
31. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005).
32. See generally Mole Davis, Ozzie and Harriet in Hell: On the Decline of Inner Suburbs,
in SPRAWL AND SUBURBIA 27 (William S. Sanders ed., 2005); WILUAM H. Lucy & DAVID L.
PHIlLIPS, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN DECLINE: STRATEGIC PLANNING R>R METROPOUfAN RENEWAL
18-19 (2000).
33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 ("Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the
takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.").
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held personal value placed on the property,34 the dashed feelings of the few were
outweighed by the potential benefits to the many.35 By emphasizing the city's
perspective, the majority opinion was able to consider the dire economic
conditions in New London separate from the specific interests that different
groups of citizens, particularly residents of the redevelopment area, might have
had. 36
3. The Kelo Majority and Legitimizing the Privatized City as Public.Possibly the most difficult problem in crafting eminent domain doctrine is how
to address the intertwined private-public nature of the redevelopment. 37 If a city
believes that it absolutely must facilitate private business, what happens to
assumptions that cities are public and acting on behalf of the general welfare?
Does the city, by working so closely with, and acting in the interests of, a private
corporation, lose its public character? Who gets to formulate the answer?
According to Kelo, the city and the state give the answer. 38 According to both
dissenting opinions, it is the courts who give the answer on behalf of property
owners.39 Recall that the arguments presented centered on the transfer of the
property to a private company to redevelop the property for its own private
benefit.40 Because the Court has long-used a functional distinction to treat cities
as having a public or private character,41 it is no longer sufficient for the City to
formally, as a matter of its legally designated identity, be the City in order to be
public and entitled to exercise eminent domain. The "public-ness" of the City is,
in effect, a rebuttable presumption. 42 Thus, the overall task for the Kelo majority
opinion was to restore the City'S eroding public legitimacy. It attempted to do
so first by resorting to legal formalism and finding that the first source of City
power and legitimacy came from the State. 43 This, of course, could not be the

34. See id. at 475 (noting that Kelo had made extensive improvements to her house and
valued it for its view).
35. See Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 237, 243-45 (2006) (discussing the competing
influences of republicanism and liberalism in the logic and philosophy of eminent domain).
36. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84.
37. See CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER, TuRNING AROUND DOWNTOWN: TwELVE STEPS TO
REVITAUZATION 5 (Brookings Institution 2005) (describing today's approach to development as
a "private/public partnership").
38. See Keio, 545 U.S. at 478.
39. [d. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40. [d. at 485 ("Petitioners contend that using eminent domain for economic development
impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private takings. Again, our cases foreclose
this objection. Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit
individual private parties.").
41. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
42. See id.
43. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84 (noting that the City invoked a state statute specifically allowing
eminent domain for economic development to effectuate its redevelopment plan).
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sole detenninant of the sufficiency of the City's "publicness" because the
authority derived from the State does not speak directly to the eminent domain
objections. The main challenge to the City's public legitimacy stemmed from
doubt about the City's public motivations and the certainty that they were
pretextual because private interests were at the heart of the City's decisions. 44
The Court used the phrase purely private purpose as an example of potentially
pretextual public purpose. 45 A city having an actual purpose of bestowing a
private benefit would supposedly be engaging in an arbitrary and capricious due
process violation. 46
The other aspect of the city's eroding public legitimacy is the breadth of
"economic development" as a justification. Many find economic development
an unconvincing justification because anything can be justified as done in
furtherance of economic development. Too often, the incremental, tertiary
benefits of economic development are over-touted as real. 47 The results of public
subsidy, either through direct financial support or assistance of eminent domain
for site assembly, are rarely scrutinized and promises for jobs are rarely
enforced. 48
The next significant source for strengthening the City's public legitimacy in
the majority opinion comes from the City's planning function: New London had
exercised eminent domain in connection with a '''carefully considered'
development plan."49 The plan itself was regarded as legitimate because the
reality of dire conditions in the city demonstrated a need to improve economic
conditions. New London had long slipped off the national economic radar and
recently lost its naval installation. 50 The city was also designated by the State as
a "distressed municipality" eligible for state financial assistance. 51 From the

44. [d. at 485.
45. [d. at 477 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
46. See id. at 478 n.5.
47. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax [ncentivesfor Business, 110 HARv. L. REv. 377,390-91 (1996).
48. See Mark Richard Lindblad, Peiformance Measurement in Local Economic Development,
41 URB. AFF. REv. 646,646 (2006) ("Despite the trend toward accountability in the public sector,
little inferential research exists on the use of accountability tools ... in local economic development
.... [I]n municipal policy making, both structural constraints and local choices matter, but local
choices matter more."); see also JULIAN Goss ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEATS AGREEMENTS:
MAKING DEVEWPMENT PROJECfS ACCOUNTABLE 21-22 (2005) (recommending ways to enforce
local economic development agreements).
49. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536
(Conn. 2004)).
50. [d. at 473 ("In 1996, the Federal Government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center,
which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and had employed over 1,500
people.").
51. !d.; see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-9(p) (West 2003) (defining distressed municipality,
a term which arose from the federal Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program.
Following termination of the UDAG program, the designation made the city eligible for state
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majority's perspective, the validity of the City's purpose was ratified because it
was part of a carefully considered plan of development, as well as by the
traditional local and state activity of promoting economic development. 52 Thus,
the problem addressed sufficiently matched the stated purposes of the
development plan.
Curiously, the comprehensiveness of the development plan is also a
legitimizing basis for the exercise of eminent domain. This is ironic because the
underlying objection to the exercise of eminent domain often is to the
comprehensiveness of the plan. While the Court acknowledged that the Pfizer
and New London Development Corporation (NLDC) plans were connected,
"local planners [by inference the NLDC] hoped that Pfizer would draw new
business to the area, thereby serving as a catalyst to the area's rejuvenation,"53
the Court found that the transfer was a method of development that was
sufficiently public to meet the public use test. 54 While seeking to convey a purely
private benefit is never a valid goal,55 the existence of a plan that passed a
rational relationship test ensures that the city never seriously encountered the
problem of seeking to confer a private benefit. 56
The final source of City legitimacy was that economic development is a valid
and traditional goal of state and local government. 57 That is, seeking to attract
or retain private companies is a legitimate government function. 58 All that New
London had chosen to do, with the hope of ensuring its financial survival and
continued provision of services to its residents, was to capitalize on possibly one
of its few assets-its waterfront.
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it
believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community,
including-but by no means limited to--new jobs and increased tax
revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and development,
the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial,
residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will
form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. 59
Thus, facilitating private action by use of the eminent domain power to the

financial assistance under Connecticut's Small Town Economic Assistance Program. See id.;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-66g (West 2007 & Supp. 2008).
52. Keto, 545 U.S. at 478,484.
53. [d. at 473.
54. [d. at 483.
55. [d. at 477.
56. [d. at 490-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting there may be occasions where the
plan is a sham).
57. [d. at 484.
58. [d. ("Promoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of
government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic development from
the other public purposes that we have recognized.").
59. /d. at 483 (footnote omitted).
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specific satisfaction of the private actors in return for the secondary and tertiary
benefits of economic activity within the town's borders is valid. 60
The greatest justification for the Kelo majority opinion is the difficulty, if not
near impossibility, of defining "bright line" rules for whether a taking is valid. 61
The Court, in effect, threw up its hands at the futility of determining a principled
way to distinguish economic development from other recognized public
purposes. 62 The decision, however, is still deeply unsatisfying. Even if
promoting economic development is a traditional, accepted function of
govemment,63 something stillfeels wrong with the exercise of eminent domain.
The source of the continued dissatisfaction with the Kelo majority opinion is the
lack of focus on the harm from the forced sale to property owners who are
commercial and residential occupants of a neighborhood.64 Even though the loss
of the property's economic value is financially compensated, the compulsory
aspect of the sale to the government and the loss of the ability to decide whether
and when to sell are not compensated. 65

B. The Dissents-Anti-Subordination Obscured by Formalism in Search
of a "Bright Line" Rule
The Kelo dissenting opinions were most concerned with the plight of private
property owners in this new world of economic development and their inability
to protect themselves during the redevelopment process. 66 According to the
dissents, the Fifth Amendment's "public use" clause was intended as an antiprivate command that would serve the interests offaimess by allowing the Court
to police "bright lines" of valid and invalid takings. Dissenting Justices
O'Connor and Thomas relied on the "bright line" of requiring some form of

60. See id.
61. /d. ("For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusi ve scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what
public needs justify the use of the takings power. ").
62. See id. at 484 ("There is ... no principled way of distinguishing economic development
from other public purposes.").
63. See id. ("Promoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function
of government.").
64. See id. at 475 ("Ten of the parcels are occupied by the owner or a family member; the
other five are held as investment properties.").
65. See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 957, 96267 (2004) (discussing the uncompensated increment). But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected
Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REv. 101, 130-36 (2006) (case study
indicating that above-market compensation for takings occurs more often than is commonly
thought).
66. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The public use clause's purpose is to
protect "stable property ownership by providing safeguards against . . . unfair use of the
government's eminent domain power-particularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons,
may be unable to protect themselves in the political process against the majority's will").
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actual physical public use or ownership.67 Roads, hospitals, and military bases
are of clear, direct public benefit because they are owned by the government.
Stadiums, railroads, and utilities are open to the public so they too are of clear,
direct public benefit. 68 The dissents diverged, however, over whether there could
be any additional "exigency" that would also justify an exercise of eminent
domain. 69 Justice O'Connor's approved exigency was the goal of affirmative
harm prevention. 70 Under this perspective, Berman and Midkiffwere transformed
from being based on deference to a public purpose into exercises of eminent
domain for the purpose of harm elimination. 71
Under either of the dissents' categorical formulations, economic
development takings are constitutionally impermissible. 72 This formulation is not
only impracticable, but also overly restrictive. First, the actual use/direct benefit
standard simply invites comparisons between the new proposed uses and the
approved list. In some places, this means that all exercises of eminent domain
will be approved; in others, it means too many will be restricted. The test is not
meaningfully more doctrinally beneficial. Second, by offering a finite list of
approved "public" purposes justifying eminent domain, the dissenting and
majority opinions all resort to tradition. The majority rests on economic
development as a traditional local government project. 73 The significant

67. [d. at 497-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (including the following as examples of
appropriate takings: (1) public ownership; (2) actual use by the public [common carriers, railroad,
a public utility, or stadium]; (3) and property that serves a public purpose and meets certain
exigencies [and harm elimination]).
68. [d.
69. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (Justice Thomas rejects the harm prevention
exigency).
70. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500.
71. See id. (citing the harm prevented in Berman as "blight resulting from extreme poverty
and in Midkiff [as the harm of] ... oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth"); see also Kelo, 545
U.S. at 486 n.16 ("Nor do our cases support Justice O'Connor's novel theory that the government
may only take property and transfer it to private parties when the initial taking eliminates some
'harmful property use.' There was nothing 'harmful' about the nonblighted department store at
issue in Berman.") (citation omitted).
72. Most dramatically, in this formulation of clear and rigid lines between valid public and
invalid private uses, the O'Connor dissent argues for a two-pronged retreat from deference to all
exercises of the police power arguing that the police power is not coterminous with public use. [d.
at 501. This "errant language" is now said to derive from mistaken dicta in Berman and Midkiff that
was not necessary to the actual holdings in those cases. /d. This language is extraordinary since
the Berman opinion was a direct response to the department store owner's claim that his property
was not harmful slum housing-it was commercial property in good condition. Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954). Thus, in Berman, there needed to be a rationale offered as to why the
scope of the redevelopment power could expand to include the functioning store when the direct
problem was dilapidated alley housing in a small section of the quadrant.
73. See id. at 484 ("[E]conomic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of
government. ").
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difference is that the dissent's proposed categorical standard of review is
troublingly similar to Agins v. City of Tiburon's74 "substantially advances"
regulatory takings test. The dissent's categories represent judicially approved
notions of appropriate projects that the Court implicitly approves as substantially
related to legitimate public purposes. Because the Court repudiated the
"substantially advances" test in Lingle v. Chevron,15 the dissent would put
eminent domain doctrine in a dilemma. Under the dissent's fonnulation, an
uncompensated regulatory taking would be subjected to a more deferential
standard of review, while a compensated physical taking would be subjected to
a heightened, standard-less, standard of review.
On the other hand, the dissent better acknowledges the difficulty of the
public-private split. Justice O'Connor aptly points out that due to the merger of
public and private, it is pointless to divine illicit purely private purposes. 76 In
economic development takings, "private benefit and incidental public benefit are,
by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing.'>77 O'Connor's dissent also
correctly rejects looking solely at the city's motive to divine the true benefits to
the city: "How much the government does or does not desire to benefit a favored
private party has no bearing on whether an economic development taking will or
will not generate secondary benefit for the public."78
While Justice O'Connor correctly identifies one type of public/private
chimera, she misses another. The types of underlying redevelopment supporting
the exercise of eminent domain that would meet her approval include railroads,
roads, and stadiums as valid public uses. 79 Private companies built those
railroads for their own profit and wielded great power in the states where the
railroad tracks were run. 80 Justice O'Connor's stadium example illustrates the
illusory certainty of the public-private distinction, since most stadiums, even
though publicly financed, are built at the behest of private sports team-owners,
according to their specifications. Thus, the stadiums usually include expensive
lUXUry skyboxes, which are inaccessible to the public, to meet team owners'
private profit goals. 81 The counter-intuitive conclusion to be drawn from Justice
O'Connor's stadium example is that perhaps the public role in building these

74. 477 U.S. 225, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528
(2005).
75. 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
76. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 502-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 502.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 497-98.
80. See AuJERTAM. SBRAGIA,DEBTWISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S. FEDERALISM AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 48-50 (1996) (during the nineteenth century, cities and states competed
to attract railroads by issuing bonds, on which they eventually defaulted, because of their desperate
quest to avoid falling into oblivion by not having a railroad pass through their town).
81. See Peter Sepulveda, Comment, The Use ojthe Eminent Domain Power in the Relocation
ojSports Stadiums to Urban Areas: Is the Public Purpose Requirement Satisfied?, 11 SETON HALL
J. SPORTL. 137, 151 (2001) (contesting the publicness of publicly financed stadium development).

2009]

REBUILDING THE PUBLIC-PRNATE CITY

111

exclusive stadiums should not be considered public, but rather a further example
of the impermissibly private.
Moreover, it is not possible to completely divorce the question of the validity
of an exercise of eminent domain from the City's motive. Motives for
redevelopment are particularly relevant since the touted benefits of economic
development are based on projections that are often indirect, long-term, and
incremental. Thus, motive is a way to evaluate whether the city's projections
should be trusted. On the other hand, the reality is that local government often
intends to benefit a favored private party, and that intention is actually part of the
projected economic benefit. However, Justice O'Connor's dissent indirectly
concedes that intention is, in fact, relevant because of the political process
failures inherent in city redevelopment. 82
Although mired in the formalism of creating core categorical definitions of
valid and invalid takings, the most apt observation in Justice O'Connor's dissent
is that citizens in a redevelopment area are unable to protect their interests in the
political process and indirectly acknowledge the problem of subordination. "The
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and
power in the political process, including large corporations and development
firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property
from those with fewer resources to those with more."S3 While O'Connor's
dissent fails to elaborate, it comes within a hair's breadth of acknowledging the
class subordination inherent in redevelopment. In light of the Court's past
unwillingness to acknowledge class as a basis for Equal Protection, this
acknowledgment is actually significant. 84 It is the opening for a conversation on
how the Constitution should respond to systematic local political process failures
and the resulting wealth-based inability to resort to democratic devices for voice,

82. Justice O'Connor correctly argues that federalism protects important state functions, but
federalism seems out of place here since it does not provide protection for citizens. The Tenth
Amendment is not a Constitutional provision "meant to curtail state action." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 504
(O'Connor, J. dissenting). While I agree, one cannot avoid the reality that Kelo's federalism
rationale (i.e., returning the issue to the states) has really galvanized extremely important local
political activism as well as spurred others to begin questioning the wisdom of economic
development activities. For an account of the typical local reaction to eminent domain, see Jennifer
Egan, A Developing Story, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2007, at A15 ("[R]esignation and bitter apathy
afflicted many residents, who disliked the project but felt that it was unstoppable. What chance do
we have ... when our mayor, governor and borough president are in lockstep with a private
developer?").
83. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1973)(rejecting
"wealth discrimination" in property-tax based school funding as a basis for suspect classification
and strict scrutiny). According to the Court, it was not feasible to do so without confronting "hard
threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under
the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary
equal protection terms, and whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature of the asserted
deprivation is of significant consequence." [d. at 19.
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redress, or protection. Unfortunately, the categorical public-use approach as a
protection for individual property rights provides inadequate conceptual space
to focus on the problem of local political process defects and does not explore
possibilities for addressing it.
Surprisingly,85 Justice Thomas's dissent comes the closest to directly
engaging issues of subordination present in redevelopment. He declines to
approve harm elimination or "blight" takings. 86 Justice Thomas, like Justice
O'Connor, applies an actual use standard87 and finds that economic development
never outweighs residents' property ownership rights. 88 However, in areas that
would be labeled as "blighted," he would only allow eminent domain to be used
if the supposed harmful land uses failed to meet a common law nuisance
standard. 89 This issue is important since the flurry of post-Kelo, state antieminent domain reform legislation has retained blight as an acceptable
justification, without regard to the subordination of eminent domain. Instead,
Justice Thomas's view accounts for both the wealth and race subordination
inherent in redevelopment. 9o He notes the systematic likelihood that "poor
communities" will bear the brunt of economic development takings 91 beyond any
financially compensable leve1. 92 He argues for heightened judicial review based
on footnote four of Carolene ProductS. 93
The deferential standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use
Clause is therefore deeply perverse. It encourages "those citizens with
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including

85. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the Set?: What Justice Clarence
Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REv. 931 (2005) (arguing
that Justice Thomas's jurisprudence falls within a tradition of Black conservative thought, which
condemns Black criminal defendants rights in favor of Black victims' rights and seeks to protect
Black people from the stigma of affirmative action).
86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that slums can be handled
under state nuisance law).
87. Id. at 512 (referring to "quintessentially public goods").
88. See id. at 512-14.
89. Id. at 520.
90. Id. at 521.
91. Id. ("Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough,
but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal
guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities
are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are
also the least politically powerful.").
92. Id. ("[N]o compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the
individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.").
93. Id. at 521-22 ("If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review of
constitutional provisions that protect 'discrete and insular minorities,' surely that principle would
apply with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects."
(quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
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large corporations and development firms" to victimize the weak. 94
Influenced by the inherent class discrimination in redevelopment, Justice
Thomas's dissent argues that the power of government should be restricted to
prevent its powers from being used by the rich to the disadvantage of the poor.
Thus, Thomas's dissenting opinion, while advancing an impracticable test,
correctly formulates the challenges oflocal economic development. As currently
practiced, local economic development raises fundamental questions about the
discretion of states and cities to use land to effectuate policy choices at the
expense of the poor.

C. Stepping Back to Survey the Glittering Landscape of Redevelopment
The type of contemplated development in Kelo is not simply limited to New
London. Similar projects, both large and small, are occurring in cities and
suburbs around the world. Development of upscale tourist, residential, and
commercial amenities and twenty-first century core growth industries, such as
high-tech service industries, health care, and institutions of higher education are
part of a prevailing approach to seeking economic vitality-the "attraction of the
affluent." While these projects can be found in residential districts with serious
abandonment problems that are still owner and tenant occupied,95 much
redevelopment does not necessarily involve occupied property; it can also be
vacant brown or grayfield redevelopment. 96 Dilapidated downtown districts in

94. [d. at 522 (citation omitted).
95. The Biotech Approach. For example, on the east side of Baltimore, a thirty-acre
residential neighborhood is being transformed with the help of the city's eminent domain powers
into a biotechnology park in a depressed section of the city, adjacent to Johns Hopkins. See Brief
for Mayor & City Council of Baltimore as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *25, Kelo v.
City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-IOS), 2005 WL 166940. The plan is for the two
million square-foot center to be used for research and business activities that will complement
existing work at Johns Hopkins. [d. Estimates are that the development will create 6000 new jobs.
"Of the approximately 1,700 total properties that the City expects to acquire in East Baltimore,
approximately 1,150, or about two-thirds, are abandoned, while approximately 550 are
currently--or recently-occupied private homes or businesses." [d.
96. The New Private City Approach. In Atlanta, Atlantic Station, for example, consists of
offices, condominiums, loft-style apartments, town homes, single-family residences, a variety of
shopping ranging from lKEA to an upscale Dillards Department Store, multiplex cinema, cafes,
restaurants, and bars.
The ... development will ultimately include 6 million square feet of ultramodern Class
A office space; 5000 residential units (from lUXUry condo lofts to more affordable
townhouses and apartments); 2 million square feet of retail and entertainment space,
including restaurants and movie theaters; 1000 hotel rooms, and 11 acres of public
parks.
Lisa Chamberlain, Square Feet: Building a City Within the City ofAtlanta, N.Y. TiMEs, May 24,
2006, at CS. Its size encouraged the Postal Service to award the neighborhood its own ZIP code:
30363. See Jamie Gumbrecht, Cracking the Zip Code ofAtlanta Cool, ATLANTAJ. CONST., Apr.
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need of rehab can be involved,97 as well as districts suffering from vacancy but
serving as a vital source of livelihood for small entrepreneurs. 98 Most of the
redevelopments are mixed use. 99 It is nearly impossible across the broad array

25, 200S, available at www.ajc.comlliving/ contentlliving/storiesl200S/04/25/zipcodes_0427 .html.
One 242-unit, four-story apartment building, Icon Apartments, will have a 20 percent affordable
living component. Debra Wood, Momentum Builds at Atlantic Station, SOUTHEAST CONSTR.
(2005), available at http://www.southeast.construction.comlfeatureslarchive!0506_Feature3.asp.
97. The New Private Downtown Approach. Attempting large-scale redevelopment on
property privately owned by multiple parties is fraught with difficulty. For example, the city of
Baltimore has been trying to get an ambitious redevelopment of its core downtown commercial
district which has been in decline and long-abandoned by major retailers. The project seeks to
acquire and transfer to private developers 100 properties owned by a variety of entities. See West
Side Story: What's at Stake in the Rush to Redevelop Baltimore's Original Downtown, BALT. CITY
PAPER, June 7, 2002, available at http://www.citypaper.comlnews/story.asp?id=3592. The plan
has unfolded slowly. Some early projects like the renovation of the Hippodrome Theater and the
Center Point apartment and office complex are completed. Lorraine Mirabella, West-Side Project
Meets Resistance; City Preservationists Say Old Retail District Should Be Saved, BALT. SUN, Dec.
12, 200S, at 16A. For the most part, however, the project has stalled for a number of reasons.
There was initial opposition for failing to include historic preservation in the redevelopment plan.
Charles Belfoure, In Baltimore's West Side, Preservation Story Unfolds, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. IS,
2001, at All; Tom Chalkey, West Side Glory, BALT. CITY PAPER, Feb. 2,2000, available at
http://www.citypaper.comlnews/story.asp?id=249S. There has been opposition from property
owners and small business owners who claim they were not included in any part of the planning.
The project has been the subject of three lawsuits over failure to make information available to
bidders to be the developer, minority contractors alleging failure to comply with public contracting
requirements, and a dispute by another failed bidder alleging mistaken inclusion of a key property
in the redevelopment plan. See Eric Siegel & Jill Rosen, Lawsuit Targets West-side Projects;
Angelos, Developer Want City to Scrap Superblock Deal, BALT. SUN, Feb. 27,2007, at IA.
9S. According to one account, ''The unlovely storefronts of the old west side are crammed
with thriving businesses, most of them owned by Asian immigrants and African-American
entrepreneurs who are, to paraphrase Bill Clinton's line, working hard and playing by the rules."
Chalkey, supra note 97.
99. Examples include the Atlantic Station project in Atlanta, Georgia, the 13S-acre mixed-use
brownfield redevelopment on the site of Atlantic Steel, a former metals-recycling business. See,
e.g., James Murdock, Next Stop: Atlantic Station, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY NEWS, Aug. I, 2003,
available at http://www.allbusiness.comloperationslfacilities-commercial-real-estate!4422322l.htrnl. Waterfront redevelopment is extremely popular as well. In the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area, not one but two redevelopments are currently underway, unrelated but relatively
close to each other. For example, the traditionally Black section of Southeast is slated to be
transformed along its waterfront, along the Anacostia River in Washington, D.C., as part of the
Anacostia Waterfront Initiative. See Anacostia Waterfront Initiative, http://www.planning.dc.gov/
planning/cup/view,a. 12S5,q,571105,planningNav_GID, 170S,planningNav,13234 I I.asp (last visited
Mar. 12, 2009). This project consists of a 2S00-acre development along the Potomac River
comprised of ten different sub-projects, including a new baseball stadium for the Washington
Nationals, a 20-mile Riverwalk Trail System, KeniIworthlParkside (described as "a Mixed-Income,
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of settings to characterize these developments as good or bad, positive or
negative. Instead, they simply are. The significance is that regardless of whether
or not direct displacement occurs, exclusion is inherent in these projects.
Large redevelopment projects will likely involve the exercise of eminent
domain, but they also may not. If eminent domain is not exercised, this
development would be characterized as seemingly purely private in terms of site
acquisition and construction-financing, yet the City always plays a role in
facilitating or making that redevelopment possible. loo As argued elsewhere,101
eminent domain is only a subset of the governmental powers that are used to
further development. The government's role in facilitating private development
is ubiquitous and multiple. What is noteworthy is that when the government uses
the eminent domain power, the government's motive is often to intervene and
further land exchange value, rather than the use value placed on land by existing
property owners and other residents. 102 This further begs an alternate explanation
of the rights and interests at stake beyond property rights conceptualizations.

Mixed Use Gateway to the Ward 7 Waterfront"), with 2000 residential units and 500,000 square
feet of commercial and retail space. Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic
Development, Anacostia Waterfront, http://dcbiz.dc.gov/dmpedlcwp/view,a,1365,q,605699,
dmpedNav,33026.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). The issue is not necessarily displacement, but
who will get to partake in the new residential and commercial amenities. If the redevelopment is
successful, it will make this area desirable and likely to gentrify. A few miles to the south, in Oxon
Hill, Maryland, a massive waterfront development, National Harbor, is nearing completion.
National Harbor, http://www.nationalharbor.comlconsumer/consumer.htm (last visited Jan. 12,
2009). Loosely reminiscent of Baltimore's Inner Harbor, National Harbor is a 3OO-acre planned
upscale tourist, entertainment destination centering around a colossal convention center with an
eighteen-story glass atrium featuring a dramatic view of the Potomac River. Id. The Center is
surrounded by upscale hotels, condominiums, shopping and restaurant venues along with ample
parking. See id.
Redevelopment is also part of stadium development. For example, eminent domain was used
to condemn both vacant and occupied property for a new stadium for Washington, D.C.'s, new
baseball team, the Washington Nationals. Dana Hedgpeth, Contesting a Stadium's Power, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 2006, at D03 (detailing the $600 million in city financing for the new baseball
stadium and land speculation in anticipation of the exercise eminent domain).
100. See, e.g., Lynne B. Sagalyn, PubliC/Private Development: Lessons from History,
Research, and Practice, 73 J. AM. PLAN. AsSN. 7, 10 (2007) (discussing the public-private nature
of redevelopment); Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme
Court: Kelo v. City of New London, VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41 (2005).
101. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. 1. CaNST. L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter
McFarlane, The New Inner City].
102. Rachel Weber, Extracting Value from the City:
Neoliberalism and Urban
Redevelopment, in SPACES OF NEOLIBERAUSM: URBAN REsTRUCTURING IN NORTH AMERICA AND
WESTERN EUROPE 172, 174, 182 (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002) (describing how
developers, assisted by the State, pursue creative destruction in order to extract the economic value
from fixed assets like real estate).
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One of the most controversial large redevelopment projects currently
underway is the Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project in the Prospect
Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York. 103 This is a twenty-two-acre
redevelopment of underutilized and underdeveloped rail yards and other
properties in the midst of a thriving Brooklyn neighborhood. I04 The planned
mixed-use development will include sixteen towers with more than 6000 units
of rental housing, with fifty percent set aside for low and middle income
renters,105 four office buildings, a glass-walled sports arena (for the New Jersey
Nets) to be designed by renowned architect Frank Gehry, a hotel, and six to
seven acres of open space. 106 The City will use eminent domain to clear parts of
the neighborhood. 107
One view of redevelopment is that both privately and publicly sponsored
redevelopment is crucial to allow cities to adapt to changing economic and
demographic conditions and to revamp and update outdated land uses and
buildings to meet a changing society's needs. 108 The other view-more difficult
to articulate because the new developments are often dramatically beautiful-is

103. Charles V. Bagli, City Planners Recommend 8% Reduction in Atlantic Yards, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2006, at B3.
104. See Nicholas Confessore, Another Step for Downtown Brooklyn Project, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16,2005, at BlO (describing some of the properties such as repair shops, a food supply store,
and abandoned residential apartment buildings as dilapidated); Nicholas Confessore, Cities Grow
up, and Some See Sprawl, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at 43 (the site is located "where a mix of
vacant lots, low-rise apartments, abandoned buildings, and condominiums now sit"); Peter Slatin,
Yard Fight, SLATIN REPORT, July 8, 2005, available at hnp:/Iwww.nolandgrab.orglarchives/
2oo5/07/yard_fight.html (discussing a rival proposal by the Extell Group for a more modest purely
residential development that would have built on existing yards footprint and avoided use of
eminent domain); see also Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[R]edevelopment
of an area in downtown Brooklyn affected with substantial blight.").
105. This arrangement is pursuant to a "community benefits agreement" between the developer
and a variety of community organizations. See Nicholas Confessore, Perspectives on the Atlantic
Yards Development through the Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12,2006, at 35.
106. See Jennifer Egan, A Developing Story, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2007, at A15 (lamenting:
"What was mostly lost in this caustic debate was the biggest question of all: what do we
Brooklynites-a diverse and even divided collective-want our borough to be? Do we want it
transformed from a sunny, low-lying place into knots of vertical superblocks? Are we content to
let our borough's future be imposed on us by developers and politicians?").
107. A recent challenge to the exercise of eminent domain was rejected at the trial court level.
Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
alleged that the takings at issue violate the public use requirement."), affd, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008); lotham Sederstrom, Yards Sued on Plan to Grab Land, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 8, 2007, at 1 ("While opponents fear the project will create a traffic nightmare
and ruin the neighborhood's character, supporters say it will create jobs and affordable housing. ").
108. According to Rachel Weber, this redevelopment is about prioritizing the exchange value
placed on inner-city communities rationalized by neo-liberal ideology. Weber, supra note 102, at
175-76.
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that not enough attention is paid to how these changes impact the urban social
fabric by creating consistent winners and losers. The consumption needs and
tastes of the affluent are prioritized in this form of development. The rejection
of older, less-upscale, land uses becomes personal, class-based, and seemingly
subjective. 109
This unfairness is starkly apparent, purposefully fostered by the market, and
insufficiently addressed by the cities. Local economic development, as currently
practiced, raises fundamental questions about the discretion of States and Cities
to use land to effectuate social and economic policy choices. The history of
redevelopment is notorious because society's needs are contested and subjective,
often colored by narrow perspectives, racism 110 and classism. III These questions
cannot be separated from the eminent domain equation. While the majority
opinion is persuasive in stating that "bright line" limits cannot, and should not,
be read into the public use clause to limit government overreaching in the name
of economic development, does that mean there can be no limits? While the
public good is the stated goal, the broad range of choices for defining the public
good and meeting that goal means that much can happen that can have negative
consequences for ordinary city residents.
Eminent domain doctrine can grapple more meaningfully with the underlying
issues presented through some exercises of eminent domain by assessing the
subordination inherent in redevelopment. The public or private label assigned
to the eminent domain decisionmaker or ultimate owner does not truly affect or
change the subordination. Because the current debate on redevelopment is

109. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,25 (1973) (refusing to apply
strict scrutiny to economic or wealth discrimination challenge to property-tax based school funding
disparities). The poor "have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1971)
(declining to extend the protection of the Equal Protection Clause against a referendum requirement
for "low rent" housing developments.); Carl Bialik, The Numbers Guy: Flaws in Measuring the
World's Poor May Hinder Solutions, WAlLST.J., June 1,2007, at Bl (noting criticism of World
Bank global poverty numbers being compiled by cumulating national poverty statistics-"[s]ome
economists argue that poverty should be defined as the inability to live at a level each person's
society deems normal. Lacking a phone in Burundi might not be associated with poverty, but it is
in the [United States],,).
110. David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the
Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 285, 315 (1998) ("[In polls]
whites tend to use the word 'racism' to refer to explicit and conscious belief in racial superiority.
African-Americans mean something different by racism: a set of practices and institutions that
result in the oppression of black people.").
111. See Bradley R. Schiller, Class Discrimination vs. Racial Discrimination, 53 REv. OF
ECON. & STAT. 263,268 (1971) (suggesting that class discrimination is as harmful and invidious
as racial discrimination and concluding that poverty harmed Black AFDC recipients more than
race).
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conducted only through the jurisprudence of eminent domain, that discussion is
too narrow. It only recognizes the individual property holder and is confined to
the public-private distinction, thereby missing the heart of the issues presented
by redevelopment. Crucial to a broadened, more realistic consideration of
redevelopment is to account for the subordination inherent in this practice.
D. The Three Faces of Subordination in Redevelopment

1. What Is Anti-Subordination?1I2-Anti-subordination originates from the
Fourteenth Amendment) \3 Equal Protection guarantee. While Equal Protection

112. Research reveals anti-subordination arguments advanced in hate speech (First
Amendment), employment law (statutory), and educationJdesegregationJaffmnative action law
(Fourteenth Amendment). See CATHARINE A. MACKlNNON, FEMINISMUNMOOIFIEO: DISCOURSES
ON LIfE AND LAW 174 (1987); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1004 (1986) (arguing that anti-subordination should inform
courts' analysis of equal protection doctrine.); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 705 n.53 (1997) (noting Catharine MacKinnon's evolution
from the term, "inequality approach" to "antisubordination"); see also Laurence H. Tribe,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1514, § 16-22, at 1521 (2d ed. 1988)(stating that the
antidiscrimination principle focuses on acts of prejudice, whereas antisubjugation focuses on legally
reinforced systems that treat some people as second-class citizens); Paul Brest, Forward: In
Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1976) (defining the
antidiscrimination principle as one disfavoring classifications, decisions, and policies based on race
and noting that other principles may be needed to address questions of economic justice); Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1341 (1988) (arguing that society refuses to
recognize the role of racial subordination) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment]; Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse
and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 79-80 (1994); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy,
104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1450-56 (1991) (applying anti subordination principles to the actions of
some state governments in criminally prosecuting pregnant drug addicts); accord Karen B. Brown
& Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction, in TAXING AMERICA 1, 2 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise
Fellows eds., 1996) ("What is missing from both the political and the academic debate about taxes
is a serious consideration of how the tax system exacerbates marketplace discrimination against
traditionally subordinated groups."); Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Preface, in TAXING
AMERICA, at vii, vii (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (and advocating the
development of "an analytical framework [that] would both uncover biases in the tax law and reveal
anti-subordination strategies to keep the tax law from maintaining and perpetuating marketplace
discrimination."); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REv.
397,452 (2000) ("By reading the ADA as extending its protections only to members of a particular
socially subordinated group, I draw on the work of scholars who have articulated an
anti subordination theory as both a description and defense of civil rights law.").
113. U[N]or shall any State deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process
oflaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
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is typically thought of as being purely about equal treatment between properly
defined, similarly situated categories of people, a rich literature argues
convincingly that anti-subordination is the true substantive 1l4 protection of the
Equal Protection Clause. The normative goal is neither mechanically equal
treatment nor merely avoidance of explicit racial classifications, but rather a
guarantee that no citizens will be relegated to second-class stanis by virtue of
societal structures, disadvantage, and oppressive treatment over time. I 15 At the
core of anti-subordination logic is the recognition that numerical minorities are
often literally incapable of protecting their interests in a majoritarian political
process. I 16 However, the goal of anti-subordination is to recognize that
subordination can be present, even in the absence of explicit racial
classifications. An accumulation of social practices can act to create a caste-like,
second-class-citizen status which then reinforces disadvantage. 117 This was at the

amend. XIV, § 1.
114. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2189
(1992) (''The point is that almost all the critical race theory literature seems to embrace the ideology
of anti-subordination in some form." (citing Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra
note 112, at 1341; Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YAlE L.J. 1329, 1398-99 (1991»; Charles R.
Lawrence ill, ForwardAce, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 819, 822-28 (1995) (arguing that liberal individualist theory fails the cause of anti-racism
and transformative humanization because it offers a nonsubstantive approach to racism that focuses
exclusively on individual harms and procedural fairness rather than the disestablishment of
ideologies, systems, and conditions of racial subordination); Charles R. Lawrence ill, Two Views
ofthe River: A Critique ofthe Liberal Defense ofAffirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 928, 942
n.51 (2001) [hereinafter Lawrence, Two Views].
115. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1477 (2004) ("Anti subordination
values are not foreign to the modem equal protection tradition, but a founding part of it, deeply
tempered by other values, including the need to have a Constitution that speaks to all."); see Ian F.
Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59
STAN. L. REv. 985, 987 n.2 (2007) ("Many critics of the anticlassification approach argue instead
that, properly understood, the Equal Protection Clause targets only those racial practices that
contribute to racial hierarchy. The proponents of this antisubordination approach prominently
include the following: J.M. Balkin ... Owen M. Fiss ... William E. Forbath ... Reva Siegel ..
. .") (citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The
infamous footnote serves as the basis of heightened judicial scrutiny of racial classifications. I have
always thought it jurisprudentially odd that the source of protection for a subset of American
citizens is in a footnote.
117. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the
Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REv. 150, 162 (1999) (noting that separate but equal laws
lead to "'antisubordination,' 'antisubjugation,' 'anti-caste' or 'substantive equality. "').
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heart of the desegregation mandate of Brown v. Board of Education,118 for
example. Segregation involved separate but equal treatment. I 19 By invalidating
separate but equal, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that equal treatment
had a disparate negative effect on Blacks. 120 The concept of anti-subordination
was that separate but equal created a disadvantaged, stigmatized status for
members of particular racial groups and the Fourteenth Amendment needed to
be interpreted in a way that addressed these forms of discrimination. 121 Critical
race theory was built on these insights into the limits of the anti-discrimination
principle to consistently call for addressing elements of structural
disadvantage-namely, subordination. These elements stem not from individual
acts of discrimination, but rather from a series of seemingly non-discriminatory
acts that keep particular groups of people disadvantaged. 122
Critical race theory teaches that subordination must be addressed when any
of the following are present: 1) politically disabling power disparities; 123 2)
caste-like status; 3) failure to reflect the perspective of the subordinated; 124 or 4)

118. Siegel, supra note 115, at 1547 ("[I]t is a history of debates over Brown that shows how
racial conflict haunts the silences, ambiguities, and conflicts of modern equal protection doctrine.").
119. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82
CIll.-KENT L. REv. 49, 84 (2007) ("The Missouri Compromise barred slaveowners from bringing
their slaves with them north of 36°30' latitude, imposing what we today would call a 'disparate
impact' on Southerners. Thus, Dred Scott not only makes an egalitarian argument for slaveholders
rights, it also makes what we would today call an 'antisubordination' argument."); Perry, supra note
112, at 79-80 (arguing that the discourse or manner of speaking about transracial adoption is
subordinating). The goal of anti-subordination is not simply a society in which everyone is treated
"equally" but rather a society in which each member is guaranteed equal respect as a human being.
120. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown l), 347 U.S. 483, 495 n. 11 (1954).
121. See Kathryn Abrams, "Groups" and the Advent of Critical Race Scholarship, at 10,
available at http://www.bepress.comlilsliss2lartlO (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (arguing that
"Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" partially contributed to the emergence of critical race
theory). But see David A. Strauss, "Group Rights" and the Problem of Statistical Discrimination,
at 6, available at http://www.bepress.comlilsliss2lartI7 (last visited Jan. 2, 2009) (arguing that the
anti-subordination principle is not really something new or exotic).
122. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS
107,108 (1976) (proposing to shift Equal Protection doctrine's emphasis on racial classifications
towards the actual social practices that disadvantage racial groups); see also Owen Fiss, Abstract,
Another Equality, available at http://www.bepress.comlils/iss2lart.201 (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
123. See Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and
Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1367 (1997) (arguing that "[r]ecent Court decisions
involving electoral district apportionment and a long-running, if disconnected, set of deliberations
regarding local government directly implicate issues of group pluralism and subordination as they
affect democratic institutions"); Perry, supra note 112, at 79 n.204 (citing and characterizing the
arguments in Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1005-14 (1986)).
124. Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 114, at 950-51 ("Critics of liberal theory, including
critical race theorists, have offered another way to think about promoting equality and human
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systemic, reinforcing disadvantage.
Additionally, anti-subordination is
unapologetically and openly political. It does not pretend that politics and
constitutional interpretation do not intermix. 125 However, anti-subordination
theory has yet to meaningfully confront the real questions of social conflict that
underlie its goal of social re-ordering,126 and the constraints on courts and
legislatures to detach themselves from the influence or control of that social
conflict. 127 Reva Siegel has insightfully observed,
[I]t is evident why the Court and many of those defending its work began
to shy from openly justifying equal protection decisions in language
concerned with group inequality or associated concepts of subordination
and status. Reasoning about practices that unjustly disadvantage groups,
or enforce their inferior or second-class status, involves positive and
normative claims of a politically provocative sort. As a descriptive
matter, concepts of subordination focus attention on agonistic group
relations that structure the polity. As a normative matter, concepts of
subordination draw into question the legitimacy of customary practices
and understandings that regulate, and rationalize, the social position of
groups. 128
Siegel's critique is not made purely from the perspective that one person's gain
is another's loss. Instead, it arises from the recognition that material resources
are at stake and recognizing harm in a society has profound implications. 129

dignity, one that reflects the perspective of the subordinated.").
125. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Tum and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REv. 1,4 (2006) ("[S]ocial and not legal change is what will be necessary to eliminate
structural workplace inequalities."); Calmore, supra note 114, at 2137-38 (arguing that critical race
theory and jazz have similar origins in that both involve notions of oppositional cultural and
political practices and potentially effective use of fundamental criticism of society); Mark Tushnet,
Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 991, 991 (2006) (defining
popular constitutionalism as "the deployment of constitutional arguments by the people themse1 ves,
independent of, and sometimes in acknowledged conflict with, constitutional interpretations offered
and enforced by the courts").
126. But see Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race
Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 AlA. L. REv. 483,530 n.199
(2003) ("[T]he anti subordination jurisprudence has remained associated with a concept of race that
inevitably would perpetuate the notion in ways that reflect nineteenth century thinking .... Thus,
the anti subordination principle has not yet led to an adequate critique of the notion of race itself,
or to a reconsideration of the comparison-based approach implicit in equal protection analysis.").
127. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641,
715 (1990); Robin West, Abstract, Groups. Equal Protection and Law, available at
http://www.bepress.comlils/iss2/art8 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause provides political ideals to guide legislation, rather than legal restraints on legislation).
128. Siegel. supra note 115. at 1544-45 (emphasis added).
129. [d.
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Siegel's theory seeks a re-allocation of rights and privileges. 130 Her critique also
considers the profound aspects of identity that arise from privilege and a sense
of vulnerability and threat of danger that accompanies privileged identities.131
The task, then, is to devise a way to make the process fair.
Even more complicating are the unresolved tensions between race and class.
At present, eminent domain doctrine leaves racial minorities and others living in
redevelopment areas to the urban political process. 132 The reality is that minority
elected officials are often in charge of carrying out redevelopment. The
economic forces and logic driving that decisionmaking and its subordinating
effect are largely unchanged by the decisionmaker's racial identity. A purely
racial lens is insufficient to understand the nature of the subordination. Instead,
race, class, and the political process-in particular, the informality of the
political process in redevelopment-must be used to flesh out an understanding
of the subordination. Anti-subordination theory is complex, multi-dimensional,
and capable of adapting,133 and when applied to eminent domain, provides an
opportunity to consider what redevelopment is and should be about.
2. Subordination in the Types ofRedevelopment Projects.-Redevelopment
seems like a straightforward process of acquiring and clearing a site and

130. Id.
131. For example, Reva Siegel makes a helpfully inductive observation about the impact of
social conflict on the retreat of the Supreme Court from the anti-subordination principle. She
argues that "[i]n deciding Brown, the Court had adopted an interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause that would alienate groups with the social standing and skills to challenge the authority of
the Court itself." See id. at 1544. She continues,
As the Court read the Constitution to draw into question the position and values of
whites who sought to maintain segregation, they in tum charged the Court with
illegitimacy and group partiality. Under assault, the Court needed more than a
principled justification for its interpretive practice. It needed an account of the
Constitution that could command the allegiance-if not the assent, then the engaged
dissent---of those the Court's decisions had estranged.
Id.
132. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race": The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U.IIL. L. REv.
615,682 ("Of the possible equal protection theories, the anti subordination or anticaste theories do
more to dismantle the historical legacy of racial and other forms of domination. Many scholars
have advocated anti subordination theories. A concern that the law promote substantive equality
by considering 'the concrete effects of government policy on the substantive condition of the
disadvantaged' unifies their analyses." (quoting Roberts, supra note 112, at 1454)). Hutchinson
also argues that the approach leaves minorities to the political process. Id.
133. Darren Lenard Hutchinson,ldentity Crisis: "Intersectionality, " "Multidimensionality, "
and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 288
(2001) (drawing from race-sexuality theory and calling for a multi-dimensional antisubordination
theory noting "structural problems in anti subordination theory ... [that positions] progressive
movements as oppositional and conflicting forces, rather than as potential alliances and coalitions,
and the failure to recognize the multidimensional and complex nature of subordination").
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constructing a set of buildings to create a new use for the property. Nevertheless,
this process also involves practices related to group formation and social
exclusion, as well as oppression and domination. Redevelopment involves social
decisions about land use that significantly alter property ownership patterns,
neighborhoods, and community networks. 134 Because redevelopment occurs in
furtherance of an upper-middle-class attraction strategy, the policy, in effect,
prioritizes the land use needs of one social class over the other. 135
The similarity of these glittering new projects to each other is striking. 136 Not
only is mixed-use (commercial and residential) development the wave of the
present, but upscale residential and commercial developments are the standard
of the day. One advantage of mixed-use development is it provides nearly all that
young urban dwellers want-proximity to services and entertainment,
excitement, walkability, upscale convenience, and controlled environment. The
main disadvantage of mixed-use development is that it is usually market-driven.
The residential tenant mix is expected to predict, match, and enable the
commercial tenant mix. Although non-upscale development can be profitable,
it is omitted from most redevelopment schema because it does not "fit the
profile." 137
There are underlying structural reasons for the similarities of these
developments. Developers replicate the same schemas because they are forced
to tell a cognizable story that financial markets easily understand. 138 Prevailing
financing mechanisms require this exclusion to replicate the limited recognized
types of real estate investment products. Failure to replicate makes financing
more expensive or even unavailable. 139 Financing demands predictable,
standardized forms of development. According to Christopher Leinberger,
nineteen standard real estate products are used by real estate developers to
produce developments that banks and other investors can readily recognize and

134. See Mihaly, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that "redevelopment [is] one of the most powerful
roles assigned to government").
135. For a more complete discussion of this point, see McFarlane, The New Inner City, supra
note 101, at 3; see also Herman L. Boschken, Global Cities, Systemic Power, and Upper-MiddleClass Influence, 38 URB. AlT. REv. 808, 808 (2003) (an "important consideration in urban
globalization is the disproportionately high presence of UMC whose membership includes
institutional professionals at the forefront of postmodern awareness and international experience.
Symbolized by a lifestyle genre, the upper middle class is more than a marker of the global city. It
exerts a subliminal influence that prescribes the cityscape policy that outcomes planners emphasize
to ensure principal membership for the city in global exchange").
136. See supra Part I.C.
137. See MARy PATII1..O McCoY, BlACK PICKET FENCES 190 (1999).
138. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITuAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND
COMMON KNOWlEDGE 25-49 (2001) (discussing ritual, common knowledge and the need to
stigmatize).
139. See Christopher B. Leinberger, Back to the Future: The Need/or Patient Equity in Real
Estate Development Finance, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REs. BRIEF, Jan. 2007, at 1,7.
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use to calculate the risk of financing or investment. l40 Building projects must
conform to one of these standard real estate product types or financing becomes
significantly more expensive. The problem is further exacerbated because real
estate financing is globalized, and distant investors in real estate investment
trusts (REITs) demand certain types of development (i.e., the product) that
produce quick returns. Not only does this lead to standardization (typically
upscale), but this homogenization leads to conservatism in decisionmaking about
the types of development to pursue. 141
This lack of "non-upscale" development is also partly due to the lack of
subsidy to provide incentive for affordable, accessible development. 142 The
historic, judicially ratified opposition to multifamily housing in zoning
ordinances and land use decisionmaking indicates that the shortage of nonupscale development is not solely a question of financial cost. 143 Even when
financial support is available for building accessible development, it will often
be opposed on race and class grounds. As Sheryll Cashin argues, property
owners have a financial stake in opposing development that might negatively
impact their property values. 144 However, this opposition is also likely due to the
stigmatization of certain social groups. The uniformity of these redevelopment
schemas contains an ideology of exclusion and inclusion. 145 Therefore, a better
accounting of the social psychology and political economy of exclusion is
needed. 146
These often "cookie-cutter" developments practice social

140. See Christopher B. Leinberger, The Needfor Alternatives to the Nineteen Standard Real
Estate Product Types, PLACES, July 2005, at 24, 24.
141. Jeffrey H. Epstein, Advertisers Divide and Conquer, FuTURIST, Mar. 1998, at 2, 16
(reviewing Joseph Turow and arguing that the prevalence of marketing to segments is splitting the
social order: "radio, magazines, and cable television ... in particular are more segmented than
ever. Relatively little content . . . is aimed at a demographically broad audience. People
increasingly filter their view ofthe world through these defined media experiences. One reason for
the marketing is that segmentation increases the likelihood that the targeted consumer will
experience a sense of personal identification with a product's image and therefore feel an interest
in purchasing and using it"). What concerns Turow most are the secondary impacts on society-the
invisible walls of isolation created by the comfort zones of similarity. See JOSEPH TuRow,
BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA WORID, at ix (1997).
142. See J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban
Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 531 (2007) (detailing eight possible and
potentially conflicting objectives of subsidized housing: "1) decent shelter; 2) wealth creation; 3)
social integration; 4) urban vitality; 5) civic engagement; 6) training; 7) institution building; and
8) efficient use of public funds").
143. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88 (1926).
144. SHERYIL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HoW RACE AND ClASS ARE
UNDERMIN1NG THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004).
145. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1850-53 (2006) (exploring strategies to exclude indirectly by creating
exclusionary vibes or constructing developments with exclusionary amenities).
146. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA.
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differentiation with exclusion as the accepted development model through the use
of clusters and geo-demograpbic profiling. 147 Target marketing in particular
locations leads to stigma 148 and disdain. 149 Clusters facilitate exclusion by
allowing specific targeting of demographic groupS.150 Society has not yet fully
appreciated how such target marketing divides instead of unites. 151 Class and
performance are made increasingly more important because of the rise of mass
affluence. 152 Citizens have been trained to be consumers; to desire, fantasize, and
"fetishize" market segmentation. Whereas a greater number of people depend on
open access to public recreational opportunities, the rise of mass affluence

L. REv. 437, 454-55 (2006) (extending the indirect exclusionary argument to clubs and
neighborhoods).
147. See generally IRIs MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POUTICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990);
IRIs MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2002).
148. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows," 67 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 319, 319 (2004)
(Perceptions of disorder increase based on race and class identity. "Seeing disorder appears to be
imbued with social meaning ... generating self-reinforcing social processes that may help account
for the perpetuation of urban racial inequality.").
149. Stigma or stigmatization "refers to an invisible sign of disapproval which permits insiders
to draw a line around 'outsiders' in order to demarcate the limits of inclusion in any group."
GERHARD F ALK, STIGMA: How WE TREAT OUTSIDERS 17 (2001). According to Falk, the American
ideology derived from the Protestant ethic
includes the belief that individual hard work leads to success and that lack of success
is caused by moral failings, self-indulgence, and a lack of self-discipline .... Americans
are likely to take credit for any outcomes in their lives which can be viewed as
successful and generally approved. Consequently ... those among us who deviate from
the Protestant work ethic will be stigmatized and ... most Americans, will severely
reject those who deviate from these norms the most.
Id. at 334.
150. This is why Costco in Seattle has a massive coffee machine for fresh ground coffee but
does not carry jumbo containers of curry as does the Costco in the Washington, D.C., area. See
MICHAEL J. WEISS, THE CLUSTERED WORID: How WE LIVE, WHAT WE BUY AND WHAT IT Au..
MEANS ABOUT WHO WE ARE 9-13 (2000) (using census data, zip codes, and marketing surveys to
classify people into lifestyle segments based on: (1) where they live-whether in a city, small town,
or rural area; (2) their lifestage-whether they are young and single, married with children, or a
retiree; and (3) their marketplace behavior). But see John T. Metzger, Clustered Spaces: Racial
Profiling in Real Estate Investment, LINCOLN mST. OF LAND POL'y CONF. PAPER 15-16 (2001)
(arguing that racial segregation is replicated in the use of clusters in real estate investment;
discussed more extensively in Audrey G. McFarlane, Who Fits the Profile?: Thoughts on Race,
Class, Clusters, and Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 877 (2006)).
151. See generally TuRow, supra note 141, at 1-2 (arguing that segmented marketing
emphasizes divisions rather than overlap).
152. See generally PAUL NUNES & BRIAN JOHNSON, MASS AFFLUENCE: SEVEN NEW RULES OF
MARKETING TO TODAY'S CONSUMER 29-58 (2004) (discussing contemporary middle class
consumer logic and demands for luxury).
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(financed by credit card debt) means that a huge number of people adopted the
attitudes and preferences of aristocracy or royalty. In tum, their consumer
demand for exclusion is built into the consumer market for commodities. The
home is a cultural commodity, and the ability to stigmatize anyone who
challenges the fantasy by being too different threatens property values. Since
types of homes determine types of commercial amenities, types of development
will likely subordinate certain non-affluent people by developing in ways that
exclude their needs and interests.
3. Subordination in the Location ofRedevelopment.-Renowned playwright
August Wilson wrote ten plays chronicling the Black American experience
through each decade of the twentieth century. 153 Nearly all of these plays were
set in the Hill District, a Black neighborhood in Pittsburgh. 154 In three ofthese
plays, set during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s, the characters struggle with the
universally human quest to cope with and make sense oflife' s challenges. 155 One
additional ongoing challenge present in two of the plays, Jitney and Two Trains
Running, is the threat of urban renewal displacing the characters from their
homes and businesses. 156 In Wilson's final play, Radio Golf, the challenge of
urban renewal was renamed economic development. The play centers around the
efforts of one character-a politically well-connected affluent Black developerto displace an elderly Black homeowner to make way for a Starbucks and a
Whole Foods. 157 The threat of redevelopment and displacement featured so
consistently in plays meant to chronicle Black life illustrates the racialized nature
of property ownership. The ubiquitous presence of urban renewal-which today
is termed economic development-means that property ownership in areas with
race and class transformation potential comes with an inherent limitationresidency is contingent and subject to revocation. Thus, the second reality of
subordination in redevelopment is that the places where redevelopment occurs
are often subordinating. 158
The measure of state and local government efficacy has long been its ability
to facilitate economic development. 159 What has changed, however, is that
globalization is rewriting the face of the city. Because the local economic
development project currently transpires in cities throughout the United States,

153. See Jackson R. Bryer & Mary C. Hartig, Introduction to CONVERSATIONS WITH AUGUST
WILSON, at vii, xiv (Jackson R. Bryer & Mary C. Hartig eds., 2006).
154. Id. at xi.
155. /d. at vii-xvi.
156. See generally Sandra G. Shannon, August Wilson Explains His Dramatic Vision: An
Interview, in CONVERSATIONS WITH AUGUST WILSON 118, 145-46 (Jackson R. Bryer & Mary C.
Hartig eds., 2006).
157. AUGUST WILSON, RADIO GoLF 9,25,48 (2007).
158. For an excellent, detailed account of how redevelopment affected a Black community in
Cocoa, Florida, see generally Judith E. Koons, Fair Housing and Community Empowerment:
Where the Roof Meets Redemption, 4 GEO. J. ON FiGIITING POVERTY 75 (1996).
159. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Local Economic Development Incentives in an Era of
Globalization: The Exploitation ofDecentralization and Mobility, 35 URB. LAW. 305,309 (2003).
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local economic development within the context of globalization has become
increasingly desperate. l60 Local economies are being driven by national and
global economic imperatives:
This process of transnational market expansion and integration is
manifested in a range of phenomena: a new international division of
labor, the global spread of financial markets, an interpenetration of
industries across borders, the spatial reorganization of production, a
temporal acceleration in economic activity, vast movements of
population, a diffusion of consumer goods, and a welter of transnational
cultural linkages. Taken together, these serve to significantly alter the
nature of places, the relations of power, and the lived experiences of
peoples in most part of the globe. 161
Though globalization is not a fixed phenomenon and not all agree on its contours,
causes, benefits, or detriments, it is still much like global warming: people
generally recognize its presence. 162 According to David Harvey, globalization is
the "freer circulation of money, commodities and people (and hence capital)
throughout the spaces of the city.,,163 Most significant is the shift in the urban
economy from production-oriented development to consumption. The chief
product of local economies shifts from work to leisure, and both local
government policy and market preference converge in a dramatic urban spatial
restructuring. The primary mechanism for local economic vitality is "attraction
of the affluent" through tourism, development of upscale residential and
commercial amenities, high-tech service industries, and institutions of higher
education.
According to Rachel Weber, states make the built environment more flexible
and responsive to the investment criteria of real estate capital through spatial
policies such as urban renewal. l64 A broad interpretation of eminent domain

160. Asmara Tekle Johnson, Correctingfor Kelo: Social Capital Impact Assessments and the
Re-balancing of Power between "Desperate" Cities, Corporate Interests, and the Average Joe, 16
CORNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL'y 187,210-29 (2006) (discussing domination of corporations over city
decisions).
161. See Sites, supra note 7, at 123.
162. Saskia Sassen' s work in The Global City posited that certain world cities were centers of
global finance and production operations such that they were global cities in population, priorities,
and economic importance. Sassen's insights can be broadened beyond these technopoles of world
capital to every city in America and across the globe because the global economy has permeated
localities everywhere. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LoNDON,
TOKYO (2d ed. 2001); e.g., Brian J. Godfrey, Urban Development and Redevelopment in San
Francisco, 87 GEOGRAPHICAL REv. 309, 322 (1997) (expanding the global city hypothesis to a
second tier of world cities like San Francisco).
163. David Harvey, The Political Economy ofPublic Space, in THE Pouncs OF PuBuc SPACE
25 (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 2006).
164. Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, Cities and Geographies of "Actually Existing
NeoLiberalism," in SPACES OF NEOLIBERAUSM 4 (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002).
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doctrine, therefore, accommodates global capital, which seeks flexibility and
change through creative destruction. Because global capital seeks sites of
lucrative investment, distant investors in REITs control or influence our local
spatial conflicts and policies. 165 Urban spatial restructuring and redevelopment
presents particular issues of land access and land tenure rights for low- and
moderate-income groups. The site of investment needs to rise in value, and
property markets with economic value depressed by racialized geography will be
particularly attractive for investment. 166 Working-class communities will always
be more subject to redevelopment so property ownership in undervalued or
centrally located urban areas is a more tenuous form of land tenure. Because
market forces and government are symbiotically intertwined in the eminent
domain process, the most compelling property rights and personhood aspect of
the eminent domain debate is the reality that no justification can erase the impact
of losing one's home and its deeply associated sense of personal autonomy,
history, and community. 167
One reason that discussing eminent domain doctrine remains relevant,

(arguing that redevelopment is contextual, depending on "the legacies of inherited institutional
frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles").
165. Weber, supra note 102, at 186; see generally Jack H. McCall, A Primer on Real Estate
Trusts: The Legal Basics of REITs, 2 'TRANSACfIONS: TENN. 1. Bus. L. 1 (2001).
166. I expand on this point in McFarlane, The New Inner City, supra note 101, at 17-21; see
also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race Theory
in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45 VILL.
L. REv. 1037, 1039 (2000) ("[R]acial spaces are visible artifacts of both racial segregation and the
relations of investment, production and exchange ... within racially subordinated communities. ").
167. There can be a plus side to the subordination ofthe location of redevelopment because
one person's subordination is, of course, another person's advantage. In this case, the sweetener
of the redevelopment's changes are the promise and reality of short-term construction jobs or
service jobs. That these jobs are often low wage or without benefits is a problem, but many say
some jobs are better than no jobs. In fact, some argue that one should bow to the inevitability of
redevelopment and adapt by seeking to benefit from it. For example, the Atlantic Yards Project is
anticipated to:
[B]ring an estimated 10,000 permanent and 15,000 construction jobs, contracting
opportunities for minority- and women-owned business, and billions of dollars in net
benefits, including $2.8 billion in new net tax revenue to New York City and New York
State over 30 years. It will make a real difference for a city where 48.3% of AfricanAmerican males are unemployed or out of the workforce entirely, more than I in 5
households pay halftheir income on rent, and fiscal problems continue to force cuts in
important services.
Brief for Brooklyn United for Innovate Local Development (BUILD) et aI. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005
WL 154143, at *3. See Confessore, supra note 105 (demonstrating that color lines have blurred
in support and opposition of the project with Black working-class people possibly being more in
support of the project rather than against because of jobs. On the other hand, one black proponent
concedes the project is "instant gentrification").

2009]

REBun.DING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE CITY

129

despite the recent flurry of state legislation purporting to restrict eminent domain
for economic development, is that these reform efforts have left the blight
exception intact. 168 The assumption is eminent domain should not be used for
economic development, but only for public infrastructure or "blighted"
properties. Given the difficulty of determining what blight is (one person's
blight is another person's community), the ease of accepting blight elimination
as a basis for exercising eminent domain is, in effect, a way of saying "[t]ake
someone else's property, not mine." Does living in a blighted neighborhood
mean one's property is any less important to the owners who consider that
blighted place home?169 What do the 'hood, a highway, and a city park have in
common? They are the quintessential types of public works projects that satisfy
the popular conception of the proper exercise of eminent domain. Public
ownership or public use of a highway or road does not eliminate potential
subordination if most highways are directed through one's neighborhood. The
other end of the urban renewal equation for Black communities and the
devastation they suffered during that era was the federal highway program.
Funds from that program were used to build highways directly through Black
neighborhoods, eliminating vibrant and thriving residential neighborhoods and
commercial districts. While the highways were public, their selected location
devastated specific people and places. 170
4. Subordination in the Method ofRedevelopment.-The most subordinating
aspects of redevelopment are probably the methods of development
decisionmaking. Redevelopment consists of a set of social and decisionmaking
practices, born both of custom and of economic necessity that favor privatized
decisionmaking. Redevelopment is a process heavily dominated by national real

168. See Dana, supra note 15, at 374-78; David A. Dana, Why the Blight Distinction in PostKelo Reform Does Matter, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COlLOQUY 30, 30-31 (2007) (discussing how few
states have banned the blight exception).
169. See Bruce Fein, Eminent Domain, Eminent Nonsense, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 12,2004, at
A16 (describing the Fort Trumbull project as a "middle-class re-enactment of Berman" and
criticizing Petitioners' effort "to make the Constitution pivot on Marxist-like class distinctions" by
limiting condemnation for redevelopment to blighted land); see also Lynn E. Blais, Urban
Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 686 n.178 (2007) ("Indeed, many
of the cases in which landowners have prevailed in state courts involve urban revitalization projects
that encompass middle-class landowners."); Dana, supra note 15, at 366 ("Kelo-inspired reform
movement privileges condemnations for blight removal and ... the stability of middle-class
households ...."); Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State
Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 177, 178-79 (2007); see, e.g., City of Norwood v. Homey, 853
N.E.2d 1115, 1144 (Ohio 2(06); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Mich.
2004).
170. See Tullock v. State Highway Comm'n, 507 F.2d 712, 714 n.l (8th Cir. 1974) (''The
impact of federally-assisted urban renewal and highway construction projects cannot be
overestimated. More than two million dwelling units were demolished by such projects in the years
between 1950-68 according to one study by the National Association of Home Builders, and some
62,000 families and individuals were displaced by federal highway programs in 1970 alone.").

130

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:97

estate investment interests, practices, and conceptions. 171 Although issues arise
because of genuine conflicts or disagreements over development, for which there
may be no constitutional prescription (it depends on politics), the main reason
courts are asked to intervene in eminent domain exercises is a political process
failure concerning redevelopment. The political process failure occurs because
the economic development process is highly privatized. Additionally, cities are
not merely welcoming to business but are using their governmental powers as
proprietors in what is known as the "public-private" partnership.172 As Marc
Mihaly argues, public and private roles have been reordered in the public-private
partnership in order to allocate risk and reward consistent with market conditions
and requirements. 173 The public-private partnership has become entrenched in
the way cities think and act. 174 As a consequence, the public role of local
government in development is now linked with private goals and perspectives.
Thus, the public's emphases fall necessarily on commercial success. Not only
does the City establish quasi-private entities to oversee development, but the city
itself is being carved up into private enclaves, both in terms of property
ownership as well as financing and governance. Most Cities have authorized
private business districts to manage these neighborhoods.175 Financing
techniques such as tax increment financing often leverage future tax revenues
arising from the new developments. Most, if not all, of the increased taxes are
paid to repay the district's debt. 176
Second, opportunities for influencing economic development decisionmaking
are limited because of the privatized decision-making process and the nature of
informal communications and relationships between corporations, developers,
Cities, and quasi-private development agencies. The economic development
decision-making process is further privatized because it is run by quasi-public
authorities immune from popular accountability.177 Privatization of public

171. See supra Part I.D.2-3.
172. See SUSAN S. F AINSTEIN, THE CITY BUILDERS: PROPERTY DEVEWPMENT IN NEW YORK
AND LoNDON, 1980-2000, at 136-37 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the lessons learned from publicityinitiated private redevelopment projects in Kings Cross and Times Square); see also David L.A.
Gordon, Review of Fainstien, June 2002, http://www.h-net.orglreviews/showrev. php?id=6384.
173. See Mark B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme
Court: Kelo v. City of New London, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 41-42 (2005), available at http://www.
vjel.orgljoumal.php?vol=2005-2006.
174. For further development of this point, see Audrey McFarlane, Putting the "Public" Back
into Public-Private Partnerships for Economic Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 39, 41
(2007).
175. See Audrey G. McFarlane Preserving Community in the City: Special Improvement
Districts and the Privatization of Urban Racialized Space, 4 STAN. AGORA 5, at *1 (Fall 2003),
available at http://agora.stanford.edulagoralvolume4/mcfarlane.shtmI.
176. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight that's Rightfor California Redevelopment Law,
52 HAsTINGS L.J. 991, 995-97 (2001).
177. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Privatization and Democratization-Reflections on the Power
of Eminent Domain, 50 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 751,755 (2006).
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decisionmaking presents a democratic political process failure. Implicit in this
argument is the understanding that in the political process of development, the
lower classes and the politically unconnected lose out in a process that is
informal, privatized, and shielded in large part from public scrutiny.
Third, strategic considerations can influence the application and waiver of
regulatory power through the informal relationship between city administrators,
developers, and any commercial entity wishing to locate in the city.178
Regulatory waivers, infrastructure write-downs, and public financing are the
norm. The public-private distinction continues on its undefined path. Cities act
like merchants or proprietors when they pursue an explicit affluent class
attraction policy and use incentives to lure and retain them.179 Charles Tiebout's
idealized vision of local governments as proprietary entities seeking to attract an
optimal number of city residents (the "consumer-voters") has come to fruition.
The problem with Tiebout's "model" is the reality that not everyone fulfills
Tiebout's idealized assumptions that are fundamental to making his model work.
Most people do not live on investment income, enjoy perfect employment
opportunities, or even have the realistic ability of escaping violent impoverished
neighborhoods. The result of both Tiebout's thesis and the reality of local
government today is an alarming slant in local government policy towards the
needs of those with wealth.
Additionally, the City's proprietor-like acts may relate to the class identity
of the elite decisionmakers who dominate development decisionmaking. The
existence of these networks suggests that part of the reason for economic
development's popularity as a local government project is not only the desire to
promote the economic growth of the municipality; it may also be attributable to
the desire to get along with one's elite peers. 180 An alternate explanation is that
the networks exist because private business has a way of legitimizing public
government. This is confirmed by the prevalence of informal relationships and
communications between corporations, developers, Cities, and quasi-private
development agencies as the operative mode of conducting city life. 181 Dealmaking and public subsidy of infrastructure costs and coverage of site acquisition
expenses are a part of this process. Redevelopment is characterized by formal
deal-making that is preceded and shaped by informal relationships and behindthe-scenes communication and agreements. These deals are run through public
approval processes only when absolutely necessary. By the time the deal reaches
the public process, the parameters are set and the nature of the development is no

178. A pro-economic development discourse also makes economic development seem
inevitable and beneficial. See David Wilson, Metaphors. Growth Coalition Discourses and Black
Poverty Neighborhoods in a U.S. City, 28 ANTIPoDE 72, 73 (1996) (analyzing the metaphors used
in "growth" discourse in urban development).
179. See McFarlane, The New Inner City, supra note 101, at 21-22.
180. Or, at the very least, one's class position must undeniably influence one's perspective
about what is desirable development.
181. See generally BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INc. How
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 17 (1989) (describing these relationships in the mid-twentieth century).
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longer subject to question or significant modification. 182 Thus, anyone inclined
to oppose such deals is forced into an all-or-nothing situation: take it or leave
it. 183
Fourth, development must happen quickly to be cost-effective. Politics are
incremental. Thus far, these disagreements over development have been ignored
in both the blight and the economic development context. Under the current
regime, the effect of the broad interpretation of public purpose is that city
property owners are left to the political process. Further indication of political
process failure is that individual property owners become the inadvertent
champions for their communities by opposing the taking of their individual
parcels. But their opposition is almost too little, too late. They should have been
involved in the formulation of the plan. Opposition to the plan typically proves
ineffective in the long term and victories usually only slow down the process.
The individual property owner against the government requires organizing and
activism to combat governmental decisionmaking. Even if one fights,
displacement may not be averted and the ability to return is not guaranteed.
In light of the nearly unlimited discretion afforded to states and local
governments in the use of eminent domain power, the real controversy is fueled
by the propriety of the underlying development plan-or to use the Court's
language, the carefully considered development plan. 184 The institutional norms
and structures of redevelopment sound very good on paper. The public entity,
the City, is authorized by the State to control the use of land. The planning
process seeks public input. The government enters into agreements with
developers to achieve jointly what either could not achieve on its own because
it is nearly impossible to cost-effectively assemble parcels for redevelopment
independently. The government does not bring the organizational structure,
know-how, or finances to carry out projects alone. Often, the anticipated market
not be touched. The lack
barriers of assembly problems suggest that a deal
of public accountability in economic development decisionmaking then raises
questions about how those plans are put together and whether a plan adequately
accounts for all relevant dimensions of the public interest. The lack of public
accountability also raises issues of public resource allocation towards large
private enterprises. 18S Many people have common-sense impressions that Cities

will

182. See Patience A. Crowder, "Ain't No Sunshine": Examining Informality and State Open
Meeting Acts as the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 TENN. L. REv.
623, 638 (2007).
183. See, e.g., David Nakamura, Council Approves Altered Stadium Deal; Requirement for
50% Private FinanCing Leaves Team's D.C. Future in Question, WASH. POST, Dec. 15,2004, at
AOl; David Nakamura & Thomas Heath, Baseball Rejects Council's Changes in Financing Plan
for D.C. Stadium, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,2004, at AOl; see also GREGORY J. CROWlEY, THE
POLITICS OF PLACE: CONTENTIOUS URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN PITTSBURGH, 145-46 (2005) (case
studies suggesting that city leaders strategically release information as late as possible to forestall
opposition).
184. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
185. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the StatesJrom Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
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are beholden to big corporations and developers and are engaged in naked landgrabs to redevelop property to more lucrative tax-receivable, luxury-related land
uses like condos and upscale retail and entertainment complexes.
The eminent domain controversy focuses on taking property from private
parties and transferring it to developers, i.e., other private persons, to put the
property to another use consistent with the town's revitalization plans. It seems
a violation of all principles of property ownership to allow government to
terminate one's property rights for the benefit of another. Yet, would
government-run reconstruction projects produce a better outcome? The publicprivate distinction is not helpful in resolving the eminent domain/redevelopment
dilemma. From an anti-subordination standpoint, redevelopment is not "okay"
by virtue of any particular legislative classification. ls6 Instead, subordination
arises from the systematic impact of executing particular governmental acts. In
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, for example, the Supreme Court allowed a
single homeowner to bring an equal protection claim based on unequal treatment
in the execution of governmental regulations. ls7 If a single act by government
can be the basis for an equal protection claim, then the cumulative effects of
similar redevelopment decisions by different local governments should seem a
justifiable basis for an inquiry into the use of eminent domain and the nature of
government support for redevelopment.
The reliance on a carefully considered plan leaves room for a form of
municipal corruption which is the giving in to the taste of the affluent and
reinforcing the disadvantage of not being upscale. If private companies want the
benefit of public powers for redevelopment, then their developments should
necessarily reflect the population in terms of residential and commercial
amenities. The issue is the forces of capital, the intersection of race, class, and
geography, and the fight for the social status of the city. ISS This aspect of

on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377,393 (1996) (discussing the pressure
to engage in economic development through business incentive competition). But see DairnlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,343 (2006) (state and city taxpayers Commerce Clause
challenge to massive business tax incentives rejected for lack of standing under Article ill of U.S.
Constitution).
186. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv.
341, 343 (1949) (in most contexts, the basic role of the Equal Protection Clause is to act as a limit
on government classifications); see, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. I, 10 (1992) (''The Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers
from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.").
187. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (finding no
cause of action because the practical result will probably be the proliferation in the federal district
courts of cases where an individual person claims that governmental officials have treated him or
her unequally).
188. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race
Theory in the Struggle for Community Control ofInvestments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45
VIlL. L. REv. 1037, 1048 (2000) ("[T]he struggle against subordination must be understood as a
struggle for power within the institutional arrangements through which power is legally organized
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Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has been an explicit project of the study
of regulatory takings. 189 Regulatory takings is also an anti-subordination
doctrine, albeit not to avoid stigma, but to preserve the privileges and privileged
status of property owners. 190 In the regulatory takings context anti-subordination
addresses the limits of the local democratic process by acknowledging that small
groups of property owners will rarely have the political will or power to
realistically challenge local government decisionmaking that limits their use of
their property. Thus, the government's actions are considered tantamount to
taking their property .191
II.

DEVELOPMENT DISAGREEMENTS IN THE SUBURBS

A. The Struggle over the Right to Development

Economic development is by no means limited to urban settings. In the
older, declining suburbs, local government councils resort to economic
development techniques previously found only in the cities. 192 In the newer,
ever-expanding suburbs, the major issue is not only development but too much
development. 193 Rural space is being paved over for new homes, commercial
office parks, and retail projects. 194 State and local government efforts focus
primarily on seeking to ameliorate the impact of development on open space,
delicate ecosystems, and disappearing rural land. They seek to regulate, balance,
or halt the development process. 195 Governmental efforts to restrict development

and deployed. This in tum means that the anti-subordination objectives at the heart of CRT depend
on reorganizing these institutional structures [and] reforming the legal doctrines that construct
them.").
189. But see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REv.
211, 211-12 (1993 ) (arguing the Court has fled from substance and accusations of "Lochnering").
190. See discussion infra Part ill.
191. As John Calmore argues, "the oppressed must use rights as attention grabbers and wedges
.... In the context of collective conflict, the assertion of rights must be seen as claims to power,
privileges, and resources." John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2214
(1992).
192. See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (discussing the
county's attempt to capitalize on its airport and follow the new aerotropolis approach to economic
development by making transportation the hub of development).
193. See JOELGARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 12 (1991)("Nowhere in the
American national character, as it turns out, is there as deep a divide as that between our reverence
for 'unspoiled' nature and our enduring devotion to 'progress. "').
194. See generally Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl
Debate in the United States, 5 HAsTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 137 (1999).
195. See, e.g., Capacity analysis plus exactions statute-FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3180 (West
2006 & Supp. 2009) (enabling local governments to measure the adequacy of public facilities and
restrict development that would exceed predicted levels of service, with exceptions for urban
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have been controversial because they interfere with the development or
investment expectations of property owners. A number of regulatory takings
challenges centering around property owners rights to develop their properties
have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, most recently in the TahoeSierra l96 and Lingle v. Chevron l97 decisions. 198 In comparison with the level of
loss and disruption seen in the eminent domain context, the regulatory takings
stories are less dramatic, less disruptive, and arguably less compelling. Yet the
response and opposition to government regulation have been no less angry or
spirited. At the heart of the regulatory takings decisions is a fundamental
disagreement over interfering with development, and a heartfelt belief that
property ownership includes a right to development.
The Supreme Court's fact-specific regulatory takings doctrine has shifted
back and forth in its responsiveness to property owners seeking the right to resist
governmental regulation and develop their properties. Overall, however, the
doctrine has been more responsive to property owners seeking the right to resist
redevelopment and retain ownership of their properties. Although the doctrine
has evolved imperfectly, its intention to solidify property-based boundaries
against the intrusion of government decisionmaking has very clearly signaled to
local governments that they should tread carefully when individual interests are
in conflict with public need.
Accordingly, the evolution of regulatory takings jurisprudence lays out one
of the most consistent anti-subordination doctrines in modem law. Although the
analysis is framed in terms of individual harm to individually held property
rights, the Court's willingness to intervene on behalf of citizens in situations of
great public need (i.e., environmental preservation l99 ) or to intervene where the
personal harm is rather minimal and the matter is one of principle (e.g. the

development or payments for improvements by developers); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIc. §§ 2-501 to
-518 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (establishing the Maryland Agriculture Land Preservation
Foundation with the power to create agricultural preservation areas and purchase agricultural land
preservation easements); Urban Growth boundary-OR. REv. STAT. § 197.296 (West 2003 & Supp.
2008) (establishing factors to measure the sufficiency of buildable lands within an urban growth
boundary that is created based on residential distribution); Growth moratorium ordinance-Union
County, N.C., Amendment to the Union County Land Use Ordinance Establishing a 12-Month
Moratorium on Major Residential Development (Aug. 15, 2005, Extended July 25, 2006), available
at http://www.co.union.nc.us/Portals/01PIanning/Agenda_Min/2006/PB_min06-20-06.pdf
(establishing a twelve-month moratorium on residential development overtive dwelling units while
the county creates an Adequate Public Facilities ordinance); Coastal protection-SANTA BARBARA
COUNTY, CAL., COASTAL ZoNING ORDINANCE, ch. 35, art. II, § 35-50 (2004) (protecting, among
other things, public access and quality of the environment through prohibition of dry sand
development, easements between road and wet sand, and set-backs for bluff
developments), available at http://www.sbcountyplanning.orglPDFlAIArtic\e%201l.pdf.
196. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
197. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
198. See id. at 531; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306.
199. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306.
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principle of the right to exclude has been abrogated in a way that the Court finds
objectionable2°O) provides a striking contrast to the eminent domain
redevelopment cases. The Court is most interested not in the individual rights of
the parties before the Court, but more generally in protecting property owners as
a group from the public enterprise of government and the public needs of the
general welfare.
In particular, the doctrine of regulatory takings evolution reflects an
imperfect, yet effective attempt to insulate private property owners from the
structural inequities of the political process. In this process, the harms to a few
or to consistently disadvantaged groups (in relation to the ability to affect
governmental decisionmaking) suggest a structural disadvantaging of property
rights in the face of increasingly complex and demanding public needs. Because
the doctrine's evolution involved an attempt, albeit largely unsuccessful, to
harden property rights protections by intervening to protect property owners
based not on the extent of impact but on principle, the evolution of the regulatory
takings doctrine suggests that regulatory takings is an anti-subordination
doctrine. By creating a bulwark against the demands of public need, the doctrine
implicitly supports individualism and withdrawal into private enclaves; it also
activates the agency of suburban property owners by giving them a right to resist
governmental decisionmaking. 201
The governmental projects of city and suburb are not unrelated. Fostering
development in one setting and attempting to regulate, if not halt, development
in another, takes place against a backdrop of each type of geographic area
battling to obtain, retain, or manage middle-class residents. 202 Both city and
suburb, to the extent this binary distinction retains salience, are engaged in a
battle for identity to ensure that they will both capture the middle- and uppermiddle class resident as well as establish themselves as the type of geographic
area most associated with the social status, privilege, and power of affluent
individuals. 203 The geography of city and suburb is closely associated with

200. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531.
201. The exclusionary zoning issue is based on this quest for some approximation of upper
middle-class status. Zoning for the tax rate necessarily sets a premium on higher end incomes and
residents. To the extent that race is associated with lower incomes in people's minds, the racial
component of upper-middle-class identity is clear (regardless of the reality). SeeJ. Peter Byrne &
Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed,
34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 527, 528 (2007); Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion's Attraction: Land Use
Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in THE TlEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBUC
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163, 172-77, 186-89 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006)
(exploring motives for exclusion).
202. See Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, DEAUNG WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A
PRiMER ON GENTRIACATION AND POUCY CHOICES I (2ool),availableathttp://www.brookings.eduJ
reportsI2001l04metropolitanPolicy.aspx ("[A] new corps of mayors has made attracting middleand upper-income residents back to their cities a leading priority, to revitalize the tax base of their
communities, the visibility of their neighborhoods and the vibrancy of their downtowns.").
203. See J. ERIC OUVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 5 (2001) (arguing that suburbanization
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maintaining an identity with particular spatial histories and configurations of
property ownership or lack of ownership.204 Therefore, economic development,
which is often predicated on attracting middle-class and affluent individuals by
building or providing residential, commercial, and retail amenities that satisfy
their consumption tastes, is in fact a battle to create a new identity for the city.
Thus, battles in the suburban context over land use related to a notion of
identity in the background of the struggle to retain the right to develop. For
example, fee simple absolute bestows the ultimate in legal rights and protections
against the encroachment of outsiders-people, the economy, and government.
This property right helps to formulate and reflect one's identity. One's identity
comes with an associated level of agency-that is, the ability to exercise free will
with regard to decisions and actions. Therefore, identity and agency are two
components of property-what one expects to receive by owning property. Both
concepts are constitutive of one another as well as a means of achieving the
other. Property ownership is ultimately intended to endow individuals with a
certain amount of agency to exercise the "sticks" in the bundle of property
rights-the right to use and enjoy, transfer, exclude; the right to be immune from
expropriation or damage, the right to devise, and so on. Therefore, property
doctrine conceives of denial of property rights as a denial of individual agency.
Although this is recognized implicitly, it is important for understanding that
regulatory takings doctrine requires an adequate consideration of these different
dimensions of property ownership to create consistent doctrines to handle
property ownership and residency across varying geographies.
The fundamental ordering principle of regulatory takings doctrine is that
sometimes regulation just "goes too far.,,205 This statement, made at the dawn of
the judicial willingness to acknowledge and provide a remedy for the impacts of
regulation on property owner agency, captures the essence of regulatory takings
doctrine. The jurisprudence associated with the doctrine is a complex, highly
contextual attempt to limit governmental regulation through an ad hoc fact-based
process, from which is distilled the refuge that property ownership provides to
citizens. Justice Holmes's famous statement reflects both an increasing
sophistication in conceptualizing property rights and an evolution in thinking
about such rights against the government's prerogative to protect the general
welfare. The statement represents a shift from willful blindness of the impacts
on citizens to an attempt to mediate between government and citizen. It turns on
judicial gut-felt principles of fundamental fairness couched in the language of
property rights.
Regulatory takings doctrine represents a slow evolution in the idea of

displaces social conflicts between citizens based on race and class into social conflicts between
political institutions).
204. It is not hard to picture geography and come up with an identity for the area-an
economic class that will be associated with a particular racial identity. Although race does not
always track class, more often than not, it does. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Propenies of
Concentration, 73 U. Cm. L. REv. 1227 (2006).
205. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
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acknowledging different impacts of the government on citizens. If a citizen can
point to a significant-enough impairment of a property that decreases the
economic value of the property enough to be considered harmful, then it will be
considered a taking. In one historical sense, this tracks a similar evolution in
eminent domain law. At one time in some jurisdictions, the government merely
took property and rarely, if ever, paid compensation. 206 This was upheld by the
courts in part because of ajudicial unwillingness to acknowledge the impacts on
property owners for fear of interrupting the governmental project. It was also
rationalized under the rubric of just compensation, which was considered a
matter of opinion. This willful blindness gradually ended and eminent domain
law and the regulatory takings concept evolved in tandem. First, eminent domain
law acknowledged different kinds of actual seizures that require compensation.
This led to acknowledging physical occupations directly connected to
government activity that severely harmed landowners under the rationale of
inverse condemnation. For example, flooding207 and blasting condemnation were
recognized as unintentional indirect exercises of eminent domain accomplished
through an affirmative government act. This idea was extended to include planes
flying overhead as a significant-enough taking tantamount to physical
occupation. 208 At this point, regulatory takings concepts and eminent domain law
diverged. Eminent domain doctrine remained steady for nearly fifty years with
the Supreme Court adopting a deferential attitude towards the local government's
exercise of eminent domain power. In contrast, regulatory takings doctrine
reflects a less generous attitude towards the local government exercise of police
power to manage the ill effects of development.

B. Is There a Right to Development? Tracing the Court's Response
to the Claim of the Right to Development
The recent evolution in regulatory takings doctrine is difficult to characterize
because each Supreme Court decision has seemed to signal a new direction.
However, some general contextual observations are relevant. First, the suburbs
rose and were created partly in response to the negatives of the city. Suburbs
were a refuge from the city's crowded conditions and a sanctuary from the large
bureaucracies controlled by ethnic immigrants and mob bosses. They were
created in a quest for local control, for exclusion, and for the right to escape from
all of the city's disadvantages. This quest to escape from disadvantage is an

206. See generally Arthur McEvoy, Markets and Ethics in U.S. Property Law, in WHO OWNS
AMERICA?: SOCIAL CONRlCf OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 94 (Harvey M. Jacobs ed., 1998) (brief
historical description of early eminent domain law).
207. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177 (1871)(extreme form of physical intrusion
is always a taking such as when a dam floods neighboring property).
208. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,267 (1946) (regular flights overhead by military
aircraft held a taking); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)
(navigational servitude on pond housing private marina that involved actual physical invasion held
a regulatory taking).
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important dimension of the geographical context of regulatory takings decisions.
Many regulatory takings cases reflect heightened privatized sensibilities about
property rights, privilege, and affluence: the suburbs are designed for the
affluent, who are usually able to buy their way out of urban disadvantages, social
disorder, and redistribution imperatives from the heterogeneous society.
Second, the regulatory takings cases reflect a struggle over whether
development is a stick in the bundle of property rights. The underlying common
claim has tended to center around a property owner's quest to develop his or her
property. The regulatory takings cases illustrate a background debate in property
law about whether the bundle of property rights includes "the right to develop."
Some commentators are unequivocal in their conviction that there is a right to
develop. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,209 the notion
of a right to develop was rejected in favor of the concept of regulatory takings as
protecting only "investment-backed" expectations of such magnitude that they
outweighed the reasonableness of public regulation. 210 Assertions of a right to
development are implicit in most of the major Supreme Court regulatory takings
decisions. Regulatory takings claims assert that the right to develop is an
inviolable stick in the bundle of property rights. Regulatory takings doctrine has
shown an indirect solicitousness of this desire to develop, which is consistent
with a common law tradition that the right to develop is highly prized in
American law. 211
Notwithstanding the acceptance of most, if not all, principles of English
common law into the property doctrine of the United States, most states rejected
English notions that did not fit with the new and developing character of the
country.2I2 In Prah v. Maretti,2I3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that

209. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
210. See Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1233-34 (1967) (citing Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992) (opining that the Court's '''takings' jurisprudence ... has traditionally been guided by the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of
rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (using the term "reasonable investment backed expectations"); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 3,5-6 (1987) (questioning Penn Central's omission of the estoppel or vested rights
doctrine as a natural limit to the extent of valid investment-backed expectations. Without these
existing doctrinal limits, "the expectations taking factor introduces a landowner tilt to taking theory
that did not exist before").
211. McEvoy, supra note 206, at 94 ("The law of property in the United States contains a
profound bias toward developmental uses and against such nonmarket values as the health and
welfare of communities that live on the land or, indeed, the ecological well-being of the land
itself.").
212. See, e.g., Dillman v. Hoffman, 38 Wis. 559, 574 (1875) ("In new states like this, the uses
of land and of structures on land are more variable with the growth of population and business, than
in England or the older states; and it might tend to impede sale and improvement of real property,
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the common law rejection of a right to sunlight reflected the fact that the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were a period of growth when change was
expected: 214
As the city grows, large grounds appurtenant to residences must be cut
up to supply more residences . . . . The cistern, the outhouse, the
cesspool, and the private drain must disappear in deference to the public
waterworks and sewer; the terrace and the garden, to the need for more
complete occupancy . . . . Strict limitation [on the recognition of
easements of light and air over adjacent premises is] in accord with the
popular conception upon which real estate has been and is daily being
conveyed in Wisconsin and to be essential to easy and rapid
development at least of our municipalities. 215
Direct restraints on alienation have also been disfavored by the courts for
development reasons:
Another evil growing out of a restraint is its effect to discourage
improvements when it is imposed upon an interest in land. A landowner
will be reluctant to make improvements upon land that he cannot sell
during the period of restraint, which may be a long term of years, or even
his whole life. In many instances, therefore, the restraint deters the
owner of land from obtaining the maximum enjoyment of it; it may also
retard the development of a particular section of the community .... If
a substantial portion of our land were subject to restraints upon
alienation, the resultant effect upon social and economic life would be
serious. 216
Laws designed to restrict development merely to preserve open land, natural
resources or wildlife are a significant departure from, if not a repudiation of, the
orientation of American property law.217 A good portion of regulatory takings

if old uses of soil or buildings should be too easily placed beyond the power of owners by
easements implied by conveyances in their chains of title. "); see also Fountainebleau Hotel Corp.
v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, 114 So. 2d 357,359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (allowing a hotel tower
to block the pool and beach of neighboring hotel, rejecting an easement for light and air on the
rationale that the English doctrine of ancient lights was rejected in the United States).
213. 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982).
214. See, e.g., id. at 236.
215. See id. at 189 (quoting Miller v. Hoeschler, 105 N.W. 790, 791 (Wis. 1905»; see also
Depner v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 232 N.W. 851, 852 (Wis. 1930). The nuisance cases further illustrate
the law's common pronouncements on development; the way in which the doctrine has been
defined and applied has encouraged unimpeded development. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 404 (1915); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972);
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
216. White v. White, 251 A.2d 470, 473-74 (N.J..Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969) (quoting 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.3, at 413-14).
217. McEvoy, supra note 206, at 101-02. (Early ''traditional common-law restrictions on
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doctrine represents an attempt to maintain consistency with the past or traditional
presumptions in favor of development. 218 The claim that the government has no
right to bother someone on his or her property only works with the implicit rural
assumption that what one does on private land does not affect others. As the
nation has developed, it has become more difficult for a property owner to argue
that what one does on his or her own property does not affect others in terms of
open land availability or unique types of property. Therefore, the presumption
towards development is no longer as universally beneficial or a matter of life and
death it once was. Similarly, the claim that one can hide on his or her land and
do anything one wants is not true. Thus, property is not immune from societal
interests.
The third general observation is that the ad hoc, factually based analysis of
the competing interests of property owner and government has resulted in a
doctrinally complex shifting back-and-forth in case outcomes. Although volumes
have been written about the imperfections and contradictions in the rules
announced in these cases, anyone who steps backs and looks at the cases will see
a relatively consistent evolution of regulatory takings reasoning since 1987. That
evolution reveals the Supreme Court's emphasis on an additional analytical
construct focusing on whether an aspect or dimension of property rights has been
impaired.219 This conceptual severance approach is further divided in two. The
first is the categorical rule, under which a particular impact on a property owner
is always a taking. The second imposes an intermediate heightened scrutiny
standard in situations where the Court perceives inequality of bargaining
power. 220 In other words, the most predictable factor in the varied outcomes221
seems to be the way in which the takings question is framed from the property
owner's perspective or from the government's perspective. The resulting takings
inquiry therefore emphasizes one side's interest and minimizes the other. In
Armstrong v. United States,222 Justice Brown offered the classic rationale for
equating certain exercises of governmental regulatory power with the eminent
domain power: the purpose of the notion of takings is "to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and

property ownership for centuries had limited the uses to which individual owners could put their
property ... so as to preserve the stability of the traditional agrarian economy over the long run .
. . . In the early nineteenth century, many of these traditional restrictions fell away as American
courts overturned these 'anti-developmental' property rules and replaced them with marketoriented, pro-development doctrines so as to encourage what the legal historian J. Willard Hurst
(1956) called the 'release of entrepreneurial energy."').
218. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1005 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
219. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
220. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825.
221. See generally John Martinez, A Critical Analysis of the 1987 Takings Trilogy: The
Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, 1 HOFSTRA PRoP. LJ. 39 (1988).
222. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.,,223
Eminent domain involves the claim of taking the right to keep one's property.
This is not merely a compensation issue, but also a takings issue. Regulatory
takings doctrine evaluates the right to use one's property and the extent of the
right to the highest and best use of land and to create new economic value from
land. The Court's intention has been to protect the ability of property owners to,
in effect, resist governmental decisionmaking in two ways. First, this is
accomplished by providing additional protection against arbitrary
decisionmaking and affirming well-considered planning that is neither arbitrary
nor capricious where there is average reciprocity of advantage. The second way
is by ensuring that particular owners have not been singled-out for arbitrary
treatment. The way in which the Penn Central Court conducted its ad hoc factbased analysis of the claim is quite instructive. It illustrates the different
dimensions of the inquiry into when government regulation has gone too far and
property rights have been impaired.

C. Regulatory Takings Analysis of the Political Process Through a
Government Lens
The aspect of the takings claim considered most salient is the economic
impact of the regulation. According to the Court, a diminution in value has to be
substantial in order to distinguish it from the ubiquitous economic impact
attendant with most government land regulation. In other words, mere
diminution in value, standing alone, cannot establish a taking.224 Instead,
diminution in value must be combined with "something else," to amount to a
taking. That "something else" could be, for example, being singled out for
discriminatory treatment. 225 In Penn Central, because the challenged landmark
law was part of a comprehensive plan of land use regulation,226 it could not
involve a singling out or "few are burdened" problem. 227
The pure property rights approach to taking would be to conceive of the

223. See id. at 49; see also Michelman, supra note 210, at 1216-17 (discussing being subject
to the control of political majorities as a compensable occasion).
224. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
225. Singling out touches on the Equal Protection dimension of takings analysis. See Nollan,
483 U.S. at 835 n.4.
226. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 132 ("[L]andmark laws are not like discriminatory,
or 'reverse spot,' zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel
for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.") (emphasis added). The opinion's
reference to discrimination through reverse-spot zoning suggests that diminution in value arguments
must be accompanied by an arbitrary unjustified decision or in other words, diminution in value
must present a substantive due process problem. Otherwise, diminution in value standing alone
with a regulation with a substantial relationship to a legitimate government purpose that's pan of
a comprehensive set of regulations will not constitute a taking.
227. /d. at 133; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,409 (1915); Miller v. Hoeschler, 105
N. W. 790, 792 (Wis. 1905). Disparate severity of impact is not enough to establish singling out.
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taken property as the entirely distinct property right, in the form of Penn
Central's air rights and the owner's expectations to have use of those property
rights for economic gain. The Court rejected this "conceptual severance" claim
that 100% of the air rights had been taken, articulating instead a "parcel as a
whole" rule:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment
have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole .... 228
Takings doctrine, however, indirectly acknowledges certain property
expectations as a cognizable loss of a stick in the bundle of property rights. First,
a claim of deprivation of a discrete property interest can escape the
unacceptability of being a conceptual severance claim when there are distinct
investment-backed expectations. 229 Second, the Court acknowledged property
expectations when it supported the landmarks law by reasoning that the plaintiffs
were not harmed because the regulation did not interfere with the present uses;
they could continue to use the property as they were and earn a reasonable return
on their investment. According to the Court, this case was not even as
sympathetic as other cases in which the governmental acts interfered with the
present uses of the properties, and yet no taking was found. 230 Because the law
does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel,23I then the claim must be rejected.
Of course, this reasoning ignores that Penn Central argued for a right to develop,
a right to create new value out of its property.
Also instructive of the takings principles important to the ad hoc analysis is
the imperfect, transferable development rights program, offered in the landmarks
law as some sort of offset or compensation for Penn Central. 232 This reasoning
seems contradictory, particularly since the opinion rejected the argument that any

228. 438 U.S. at 130-31.
229. The reference to those expectations actually was mentioned in an attempt to distinguish
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon's acceptance of a conceptual severance claim by characterizing that
decision as being about "distinct investment-backed expectations" and by implication, not about
conceptual severance. [d. at 127 (citing Pa. Coal Co.v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415-16 (1922)
(Mahon is "the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers
important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to
a 'taking."').
230. 438 U.S. at 136 ("Unlike the governmental acts in Goldblatt, Miller, Causby, Griggs, and
Hadacheck, the New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the
Terminal .... [A]ppellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the
past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions.").
231. [d.
232. [d. at 137.
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regulatory takings had occurred because diminution in value standing alone was
not enough of a basis for a takings claim. However, this prong of the opinion
actually relates more to the reasonableness of the program-that government had
sought to be somewhat accommodating and attempted to ameliorate, albeit
imperfectly, the impact of the regulation. Although not required to do so in order
to pass muster under a takings analysis, it bolstered the planning that went into
crafting the regulatory program-it had tried to be fair. In other words, where
the regulation is substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare 233
and the present uses are not impaired, and a claim of negative economic impact
stands alone without substantive due process violations, there is no taking.
Primary expectations or investment-backed expectations are not impaired. 234
The overall lesson of Penn Central with respect to development
disagreements is to defer to the government's exercise of police power. The
decision announced a rule that was intended to definitively signal that takings
analysis was to be deferential to exercises of governmental regulatory power if
certain conditions existed to ensure that the decision was not arbitrary, and
exercises of regulatory power are presumed to contain no substantive due process
violations where the challenged regulation was part of a well-considered plan.
This government-focused regulatory takings decision thus shows a presumption
of the validity of government regulation. Nevertheless, the no-takings calculus
also pays attention to attempts to be fair as part of the reasonableness calculation.
Concrete and demonstrable attempts to be fair by addressing legitimate property
expectations are part of the calculation of the reasonableness of a redevelopment
scheme.

D. Regulatory Takings and Development Disagreements from the
Property-Owner's Perspective-Conceptual Severance Revisited
The flip side of the government-focused regulatory takings analysis is the
property rights-based analysis and a receptiveness to conceptual severancefocusing on whether an aspect or dimension of property rights has been
impaired. 235 The conceptual severance approach is further divided into two
approaches. The first is the categorical approach under which a particular impact
on a property owner is always a taking. The second is to impose an intermediate,
heightened scrutiny standard in situations where the Court perceives inequality
of bargaining power. 236

233. [d. at 127, 138.

234. The Court later deviated from this government-focused deferential, anti-conceptual
severance, severe impact combined with arbitrary government decisionmaking take on regulatory
takings in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982), which
resorted to a categorical rule based on a conceptual severance claim of physical occupation. This
claim was then not acknowledged to be a conceptual severance claim, but viewed as a physical
occupation claim. [d. at 427.
235. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
236. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
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The cases illustrate that strong property owner protections are not easily
reconcilable with deference to government prerogatives or government
judgments. For example, the opinion in Kaiser v. Aetna,237 though contradictory
and more of an illustration of results-oriented jurisprudence, is instructive of the
relevant property rights interests when considering takings claims from the
property owner's perspective. These include the right to exclude, property
owners expectations, and detrimental reliance. Of these, the right to exclude and
the owner's substantial financial investment were the predominant concerns. 238
Any precedent for deference to government was eliminated by the government's
supposed complicity in the owner's investment. Granting a dredging permit,
which was an implied consent to the investment. 239 Kaiser's overall lesson is that
government complicity in creating or allowing an investment equitably estops the
In the
government from retreating from supporting that investment.
redevelopment and gentrification context, this suggests that the individuals
driven out were those encouraged to invest in the city by the City. Because they
held the city together a protectible property interest in remaining in the
community, seeing that investment and commitment come to fruition, or
continuing to enjoy that investment should be acknowledged.
1. Conceptual Severance and Investment Backed Expectations from the
Property Owner's Perspective.-Notwithstanding Penn Central's rejection of
conceptual severance, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Commission 240 looked at the matter from the property owner's perspective. The
Court regarded the loss of even a strand in the bundle of property rights as very
important. 241 In particular, the right to decide to retain ownership is as
fundamental to property ownership as any other right. 242 The property owner was
prevented from developing two small parcels of land with attractive use value
and lucrative development potential as residential beachfront property?43 The
case squarely confronted the question of what to do about the competing goals
of development and wanting to maximize financial investment for profit and the

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
237. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
238. [d. at 174-75.
239. Though oriented to the interests of the property owner, the Kaiser majority opinion was
consistent with Penn Central, that there was no real balancing of the competing interests. No
deference could eliminate the problem that, in the majority's view, a compensable property interest
had been impaired. This is consistent with both the Loretto line of cases which are called physical
takings, as well as part of Penn Central by its emphasis on the economic impact; interference with
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government regulation.
240. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
241. [d. at 1027.
242. [d. at 1028-29.
243. In keeping with the view that our vision of property's value and the most important stick
in the bundle being the right to exclude, in the early nineteenth century, the beach was referred to
as a wasteland; its aesthetic use value was not fully appreciated by anyone at all. See Pierson v.
Post, 3 CaL R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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goal of environmental preservation. Though situated in the hardened framework
of property rights analysis, the underlying question was, what does fairness
dictate?
Lucas's inability to exploit the economic potential of the land by developing
his parcel was equated to the "essential right to exclude stick" in the bundle of
property rights. Thus, the Court found a balancing approach to the takings
question inappropriate because the severe impact on the property owner trumped
the governmental interest. 244 Deference to governmental regulation "d[id] not
apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a
landowner of all economically beneficial uses.,,245 Instead, categorical treatment
was necessary. Although it took much logical work to supportably reach this
conclusion,246 the result was a categorical rule for takings where there was
elimination of value. It is difficult to imagine, however, what regulatory
circumstance would result in a hundred percent elimination of property value. 247
As in all regulatory takings cases, the real issue not addressed in Lucas is the
development disagreement. The whole doctrine of regulatory takings has been
raised around the question of whether the government can impose regulatory
harm on a property owner. Yet, the question is impossible to resolve sensibly
because the issue is framed in competing versions of the doctrine. 248 Once the
issue goes past physical appropriation, any takings analysis runs into the
overwhelming power and interest in governance contained in police power.
Property owners are supposed to protect their interests through the democratic
process. By declaring that certain property rights always trump government
regulation that is otherwise not corrupt or arbitrary or capricious,249 regulatory
takings analysis in effect acknowledges the shortcomings of the local political
process. The Court in Lucas used property law to give property owners an "out"
from disagreements over development, thus, in effect, creating a "right to
development." Using property law to mediate with government on behalf of
property owners in this manner specifically fails to acknowledge the subjective,
gut-based, substantive decision made about what are fair property owner
expectations and what are fair, or unfair, government actions.25o

244. Interestingly, Lucas is really a temporary takings case. The Beachfront Management Act
was amended to allow for special permits in 1990, two years after the complained of 1988
amendments, yet the Court proceeded to decide the case because Lucas would be denied a remedy
for the two years during which he had been denied the ability to build. Thus, there was temporal
conceptual severance in this case. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012.
245. ld. at 1017.
246. ld. at 1022-23, 1025 n.12, 1027, 1031.
247. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,321-22
(2002) (discussing the rareness of 100% elimination of value).
248. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978).
249. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 754
n.l3 (1999).
250. Even more so, beyond this lack of acknowledgment, there has been a decision to protect
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Instead, the Lucas Court responded to the development versus preservation
dilemma by fashioning an unworkable categorical rule that total elimination of
value was a per se taking unless justified by common law understandings from
the nineteenth century. This is a significant example of a masked exercise of
substantive due process. The decision attempted to structure legal doctrine as a
bulwark against any justification for modern governmental decisionmaking that
might retard land development. The decision therefore embraced a right to
development and acknowledged it as part of the expectation of land ownership.
The increasing economic value of land, not for its productive features, such as
agriculture, but for its use features as a place of residence or commerce, raises
the question, what happens if land is no longer available under government
regulation for the desired use? In some ways, the Court's approach is not without
precedent and makes perverse sense. As discussed above, the common law of
this country has traditionally promoted the free use and development of land. 25 \
Today, it seems that the community's expectation ofland has evolved such that
an expected right to development-regardless of whether it is in fact a right-has
been granted increasing recognition by the Supreme Court. Recognizing
community standards for this evolving economic expectation certainly has
implications for the urban side of eminent domain law. In particular, would a
categorical rule be called for in certain exigent circumstances when there is a
political process failure in the eminent domain context?
2. Inequality of Bargaining Power and Political Process Failure in the
Context of Development: Heightened Scrutiny and Expectation.-The Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission252 and Dolan v. City ofTigar~53 decisions are
regulatory takings cases that deal directly with development disputes between
property owners seeking to expand the development of their properties and the
difficulty of negotiating with government. In both cases, the right to cross
someone's land in return for the right to develop was subjected to heightened
scrutiny and held to a strict means-ends standard of fairness and appropriateness.
In both cases, the Court intervened and elevated the individual's right to be free

economically beneficial uses; while this sounds hard and fast, it is an arbitrary selection to the
benefit of the property owner. This is seemingly consistent with the eminent domain reliance on
fair market value to compensate owners even when there is significant personal loss, except that
concept is to the benefit of the government. See Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark:
Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L.
REv. 91, 123 (1995).
251. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413-14 (1915) (no taking when
prohibited activity could be performed elsewhere). But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1059 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("[S]tate courts historically have been less likely to find that a government action
constitutes a taking when the affected land is undeveloped .... [T]he power of the legislature to
take unimproved land without proper compensation was [also] sanctioned by 'ancient rights and
principles."') (emphasis added) (quoting Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. 38, 57 (S.c. Ct. App.
1796))) (emphasis added).
252. NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
253. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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from the Government's strong-arming in negOtiatIOns to a constitutionally
protected property right. Both Nollan and Dolan were analyzed from the
property owner's perspective with no balancing of the competing interests.
The Nollans's desire to enlarge a tiny, dilapidated, single-story bungalow
along the California coast into a two-story, three-bedroom house with a two-car
garage was restricted by California's strict regulation of coastal development. 254
The grant of the Nollans' application for a coastal development permit was
conditioned upon their provision of "lateral access to the public beaches in the
form of an easement across their property.,,255 They claimed that this condition
constituted a taking of their property,256 and the Court was receptive to their
claim.257 The Commission's requirement of an easement as a condition to
receiving the coastal permit meant that the substance of the permit requirement
compromised the right to exclude. 258 Also, the manner of acquiring the easement
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using an improper unilateral form of
bargaining. 259
The Nollan opinion seems to have utilized a substantive due process analysis
whereby the Court's consideration of the existence of a taking was necessarily
informed by a disagreement with the nature of the underlying regulation. 260 The
opinion begins with the observation: "We have long recognized that land-use
regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state
interests' and does not' den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.' ,,261
"[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but
'an out and out plan of extortion. ",262 Consistent with the "substantially
advances" prong of the Agins v. Tiburon test263 (now repudiated in Lingle v.
Chevron 264 ), the Court announced an "essential nexus" standard for such

254. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-29.
255. Id. at 829. ''The Commission ... had similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal
development permits along the same tract of land." [d.
256. Id.
257. [d. at 836.
258. See id. at 831-32.
259. [d. at 832.
260. See id. at 838-39.
261. Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 529 (2005». The difference in the formulation of the
Agins standard is striking. In Lucas, the Court used an "or" formulation which supported the
conclusion that diminution in value standing alone was enough for a regulatory takings. In this
case, the "and" standard is conveniently supportive of the means-end test formulated by the Court.
262. /d. at 837 (quotingJ.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981»; see
also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994) (further characterizing the permit condition
as "gimmickry").
263. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
264. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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conditions and found that this condition failed the test. 265
Nollan appears to be primarily about the Supreme Court reacting protectively
to an inequality of bargaining power between local government and citizens who
wish to develop. The Court sought to weigh in on behalf of the property
owner.266 This is colorfully illustrated by the majority opinion's use of terms like
"extortion,,267 and "leveraging of the police power.,,268 To extort is defined as "to
obtain from a person by force, intimidation or undue or illegal power.,,269 The
particular impact on the property owner, of being required to convey a property
interest like an easement as the condition for obtaining a permit to develop, was
deemed to present the "heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.'027o
Under the articulated standard in the case, the propriety of this decision could
only be reached by the Court's eschewing the deferential standard of the
"reasonable relationship test" and adopting a higher standard such as
"substantially advances a legitimate governmental interest."27I Thus, the
proposed bargain, impacting the right to exclude imposed by the government,
was, at best, suggestive of a substantive due process violation.
Requiring the government to provide a precise connection between the
increased impact of the proposed development and the permit condition makes
sense only in the abstract, removed from the actual context of governing. In
reality, the government is responsible for meeting multiple, often conflicting
public needs. Coastal protection perfectly reflects the tradeoffs between many
public needs. 272 Because government has to accommodate many interests, and
has accommodated many interests in the past, the opinion does not explain why
government cannot juggle these many accommodations by offsetting the
management of one while obtaining a concession on the other. 273 In other words,
if visual access is decreased, why can the government not compensate for that
decrease, or balance out that decrease by securing another concession that would
be otherwise beneficial to the public? Although beach access in no way
compensates for the loss of view, it shifts the public rights and public benefits in

265. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
266. See id. at 839.
267. Id. at 837.
268. Id. at 837 n.5.
269. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COUEGIATE DICfIONARY 440 (1991).
270. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 84l.
271. But see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005) (explicitly repudiating
the "substantially advances" heightened standard of review in regulatory takings cases). The
opinion states that the Court considers Nollan good law as an unconstitutional condition requiring
a person to give up a constitutional right in return for some government action. Id. at 546; see Mark
Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts ojExactions,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 729,730-31 (2007) (arguing that "exactions decisions sit uneasily alongside ..
. Lingle to make sense of its long, confusing line of takings decisions").
272. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009-10 (1992).
273. See Nolan, 483 U.S. at 825.
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a way that is beneficial to the pUblic.274 Narrowly viewing the issue as a loss of
a strand from the bundle of rights-the right to exclude-ignores this very
compelling context and allows property owners to narrowly conceive of and
enforce their property rights, regardless of public concessions that secure and
enhance these property rights. 275
Nollan involved homeowners who were opposed to sharing the beach with
the public and a Court that agreed they were right to object. The Court disagreed
that the government should be able to do anything short of a forced purchase to
impair that expectation of immunity from public access across their property,
even where economic injury does not exist. 276 The Court considered it
unconscionable for government to use its regulatory might to allow strangers to
occupy one's land. How did an easement get equated with quartering troops on
one's land if the impact was minimal at best? The Court's willingness to
acknowledge impairment of the landowners' agency to exercise a right is
apparent. Also evident was a sense that fundamental fairness was violated
because the government always has more muscle to win. Thus, Nollan stands for
the principle that there is a fundamental right not to be strong-armed by
government because of the unequal bargaining power between citizen and
government. 277 This is a neo-classic concern with the inequality of bargaining

274. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion points out the obvious reciprocity of advantage view
of this case:
[The] development obviously significantly increases the value of appellants' property;
appellants make no contention that this increase is offset by any diminution in value
.... Furthermore, appellants ... benefit from the ... permit condition program. They
are able to walk along the beach beyond the confines of their own property only
because the Commission has required deed restrictions as a condition of approving
other new beach developments.
[d. at 856 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
275. J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus": How State and Federal
Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 373 (2002); Lee Ann Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions
Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REv. I (2000); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas:
Exactions and the Consequences ofClarity, 92 CAL. L. REv. 609 (2004); see also Carlson & Pollak,
supra note 16, at 115-16 (study indicating "Nollan and Dolan penalize ad hoc decisions to impose
exactions ... but may actually encourage the imposition of higher impact fees").
276. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, appellants' claim of
economic injury is flawed because it rests on the assumption of entitlement to the full value of their
new development. Appellants submitted a proposal for more intensive development of the coast,
which the Commission was under no obligation to approve, and now argue that a regulation
designed to ameliorate the impact of that development deprives them of the full value of their
improvements. Even if this novel claim were somehow cognizable, it is not significant. '[T]he
interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other
property-related interests."') (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
277. The view that it is the impact on a few for the benefit of the many fails to explain the
outcome. It seems instead there is a sense of entitlement to have a beach house consistent with
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power. The Court is in effect saying that imposing standards to make the
exercise of unequal power fair is important. These standards are usually read
into contracts between individuals, where one is poor, uneducated, and unaware
of his or her rights, or is desperate enough to waive fundamental rights and make
deals that are detrimental to his or her interests. Here, the citizens are affluent,
educated, and aware of their rights, and are arguably making a deal that benefits
their interests. Nevertheless, this bargaining inequality is inimical in the Court's
view and demands the Court's intervention. 278
In Lingle v. Chevron,279 the Court used a challenge to a gas service station
regulation capping rents, which did not involve a regulatory taking, to clarify
regulatory takings doctrine and the appropriateness of substantive due process
reasoning. The Court repudiated any suggestion that substantive due process
analysis belonged in regulatory takings doctrine. 28o The Court attributed the
source of the doctrinal confusion to be Agins v. City ofTiburon 'S281 "substantially
advances" standard which used an impermissibly heightened means-ends test. 282
Though Nollan (and Dolan) used the substantially advances test, the Court
identified a new source of precedent that supported those decisions. According
to the Court, these cases could survive decoupling from Agins's heightened
substantive standard by viewing them as drawing their rationale from another line
of doctrine known as "unconstitutional conditions.,,283 This ad hoc line of cases
prohibits government from conditioning receipt of some benefit upon the
surrender of a constitutional right. Curiously, the constitutional rights protected
in prior "unconstitutional conditions" cases involved civil rights like freedom of
speech and religion. Nollan and Dolan represent the first set of cases to equate
property rights with fundamental civil rights. 284
Notwithstanding Lingle's attempt to inoculate Nollan and Dolan from the
heightened means/end test, the Nollan essential nexus test, and the rough
proportionality standard, the opinions are clear in expressing a judicial
disagreement with the underlying reasons advanced for the exaction or condition
posed by the legislation. Thus, both Nollan and Dolan provide a detailed and
difficult analytic regime for municipalities to provide a factual basis for their

affluent expectations of privacy and exclusion of the public.
278. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703-04
(1999) (upholding a $1.45 million jury verdict for landowners where they sought to develop an
ocean-front parcel, but were impeded by arbitrary delay and denial by local government).
279. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
280. Id. at 545-48.
281. 447 U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by Lingle, 544 U.S. 528.
282. See Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart o/the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle and
Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 637 (2007).
283. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48.
284. See ROBERT B. STANDLER, DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDmONS IN THE USA
3 (2005), available at http://www.rbs2.comlduc.pdf (summarizing the cases and articles about
unconstitutional conditions).
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legislative decisions. 285 The Court's opinion provides a detailed analytic regime
for municipalities to prove the validity of their legislative decision. 286
Dolan is a more sober and balanced opinion than Nollan. It is written from
both the government's and the property owner's perspectives because the case
had to venture where Nollan did not. The Dolan Court acknowledged the right
of the government to regulate and define the connection between the condition
and the government regulation, thus defining how far this exaction regulation
could gO.287 The question turned upon whether the supporting "findings [were]
constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on
petitioner's building permit.,,288 After surveying various state standards, the
Court stated it was selecting the intermediate standard requiring a reasonable
relationship, which it translated to mean a standard of "rough proportionality."
"No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.,,289
The Court invalidated the conditions for failing the first prong of essential
nexus 290 and failure of rough proportionality.29I Though this opinion was
arguably more balanced than Nollan, it suffers from the same substantive defect.
The Court was influenced by gut-felt fundamental fairness principles in
fashioning the unprecedented "rough proportionality" standard. Moreover, the
Court refused to "cut local government any slack," instead holding them to an
exacting and expensive standard of justifying government actions with very
precise studies individually tailored to the impacts of individual property owners.
Although such studies can only come at great cost, it is possible to find a
consultant to conduct studies to support one's actions. This requirement of
"more paper" signals that the Supreme Court was willing to intervene to equalize
the bargaining power between government and citizen by raising the costs of
justifying what were likely well-founded exercises of regulatory power in

285. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987). But see generally D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential
Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due
Process, 69 ALB. L. REv. 343 (2005).
286. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 398 (rough proportionality and individualized determination);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("essential nexus").
287. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388 ("[W]hether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's
permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed
development." (citing NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987»).
288. Id. at 389.
289. Id. at 391.
290. Id. at 394-95 ("We conclude that the findings upon which the city relies do not show the
required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and the petitioner's proposed new
building.").
291. /d. at 395-96 ("No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway
beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated.").
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furtherance of the public welfare. The Dolan decision imposed an impediment
that could slow the government down and limit the scope of what it could
accomplish through exactions. Where a property owner substantially disagrees
with the exercise of a governmental regulatory power, Dolan tipped the balance
of power between government and citizen in favor of the citizen as property
owner.
The most striking aspect of the implicit role of unequal bargaining power in
the Supreme Court's property rights jurisprudence is that the property owners do
not fit the profile of people who are typically protected under the inequality of
bargaining power rationale. The owners are neither uneducated, disabled,
elderly, or impoverished. They are, in fact, the opposite-owners of lucrative
pieces of real estate who are able to reach the Supreme Court to vindicate rights
based on principle rather than on irreparable or severe harm. 292 What about these
property owners triggers the inequality of bargaining power scrutiny? It can only
be the view of the government as an overly powerful entity that poses threats to
property owners beyond the ability of any individual property owner to address
their complaints or concerns through the political process. Because the opinions
are silent about the need or ability of property owners to seek redress through the
political process, the Court then may be led to believe such processes to be
unavailing or too costly.293
In effect, the Nollan and Dolan cases evince a concern that property owners
who wish to develop have been singled out. While this singling-out is not of any
great economic detriment, it raises Fourteenth Amendment Due Process concerns
by interfering with the property owner's expectation to exploit the economic
potential of his or her property. The categorical rules signal that it is arbitrary
and capricious or unreasonable for the government to thwart the desire or
expectations of a property owner who seeks to develop, merely because the
owner is fortunate enough to own beachfront or waterfront property, as in Dolan.
Thus, the regulatory takings cases represent the landed privileged who should
essentially be immune from disadvantage because they own desirable land. The
privileges and benefits that attend to this form of property ownership are
particularly troublesome to the Court.294 Apparently privileged property
ownership should be more protected from government interference or from the
needs of the public.

E. Implications of Attempting to Split the Difference in Perspective
Between Government and Property Owner: Reigning in the
Categorical but Maintaining the Warning to Government
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court returned to the government-focused analysis of
regulatory takings cases. 295 The decision reflects the Court's struggle to mediate

292.
293.
294.
295.

See id. at 379; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-30.
See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).

154

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:97

a balance between the two approaches in simultaneous retreat from, but
acceptance of, the more property-based approach to regulatory takings. The
retreat results from recognition that the natural trajectory of the stronger
property-based takings decisions like Lucas 296 and First English 297 presented
administrability problems. The Court's refusal to overrule any property-based
precedent signals that governments should take note and be careful in land use
regulation.
Tahoe-Sierra reflects the battle between Penn Central's balancing approach
to takings and the combination of First English and Lucas gut-satisfying,
categorical, conceptual severance approach to takings. 298 The Tahoe-Sierra
property owners were apparently powerless to affect a very complex and
technical planning and political process. In some ways, their only leverage was
to impose a financial penalty on the government for failing to devise a timely
plan. 299 Thus, even if they did not have the political clout to move the process
along, this leverage provided at least a more consequential voice because it
exacted a financial penalty on the government for delaying the owners'
personally beneficial use (building on their lots and enjoying the lake for
themselves).300 Similarly, they could have financially benefited from developing
their lot and enjoying the lucrative advantage of improving the value of the parcel
and creating an economic opportunity for themselves.
The majority opinion explained that a temporary moratorium is neither a
The answer would depend on the particular
taking nor not-a-taking.
circumstances of the case. 30l The opinion then corralled the categorical rules
from Lucas. 302 Physical occupation cases are not precedent for evaluating a
claim of a regulatory taking. 303 The Court seemed to imply that regulatory
takings do not therefore represent as great an affront to individual property rights.
While a categorical rule might be appropriate for a physical occupation, in the
regulatory taking context, the categorical rule will only apply when there has

296. Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
297. First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
298. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302.
299. ld. at 310-12.
300. See id. Interestingly, this was one of the arguments advanced but never granted any
cognizance by the Court.
301. ld. at 331.
302. The examples offered by the majority opinion illustrate that the physical part of takings
law does not make much sense because what is physical? Is the physicality the source of the
purported harm or is it the magnitude of the impact of the regulation that is the source of the harm?
See id. at 330 (explaining the Lucas rule based on "extraordinary circumstances") (citing Lucas v.
S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)).
303. ld. at 322. Physical takings are still at the takings end of the continuum and categorically
require compensation. "When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property
for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner regardless of
whether the interest that is taken constitutes the entire parcel or merely a part thereof." ld. (citation
omitted)
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been permanent obliteration of the value of a fee simple estate. This must be an
obliteration of 100% of the value of the parcel; a mere 95% would not be enough
of a diminution to justify categorical treatment?04 Instead, the operative default
rule for determining when a regulatory taking has occurred requires a factspecific inquiry.305 The matter turns on whether the issue presents a question of
whether there is an interest in protecting individual property owners from bearing
public burdens, "which in all fairness and justice should be borne by the public
as a whole.,,306 This statement brings us full circle to the purpose of the taking
inquiry--<ietermining when it is unfair as a matter of property rights to single out
certain property owners from an Equal Protection perspective guided by a
substantive Due Process assessment of fairness. The anti-subordination rationale
is clear; it looks to the impact of the deprivation as compared to others and
assesses its fairness.
Similar to Lingle's determination to rescue Nollan and Dolan, perhaps the
weakest aspect of Tahoe-Sierra is that it affirms the validity of the Lucas Court's
finding a permanent deprivation of all value when, in reality, Mr. Lucas did not
suffer a permanent depri vation of all value. 307 The regulation was not permanent.
Without permanence, the permanent deprivation of value did not actually occur.
Yet the Lucas case precipitated a categorical rule stating that there was a
permanentdeprivation. 308 The petitioners' arguments in Tahoe-Sierra for similar
categorical treatment make sense as long as Lucas is retained as good law. Why
did Tahoe-Sierra decline to follow the absolutist language and reasoning of
Lucas and First English? The primary reason is that the rules announced,
notwithstanding their emotionally gratifying categorical protections from the
excess of government interference with private property rights, were
unadministrable. Regulatory takings cases are really about fairness rather than
any bedrock coherent right of property. Within the constraining rubric of
property rights, the taking principle admits of no limit-government regulation
necessarily diminishes the free use of property. While the reciprocity of
advantage rationale in Penn Central is appealing to some, to others that approach
to protection of property rights is too diffuse and indirect. On the other hand, the
absolutist vision of regulatory takings admits of no limits, and any attempt to
signal limits results in rules that are difficult, if not impossible, to apply
consistently.
One might conclude that the Penn Central standard re-invoked in TahoeSierra means that local governments need not worry about regulatory takings
claims. Instead, notwithstanding Lucas's banishment to the margins of
regulatory takings jurisprudence, it is significant that Lucas was not overruled. 309

304. See id. at 330 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.S (noting that the categorical rule does
not apply to diminutions in value of 95%».
305. [d. at 332.
306. [d. at 321 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960».
307. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020 (discussing limits on Mr. Lucas's land).
30S. See id. at 1017.
309. The same can be said of Nollan's and Dolan's similar, yet less convincing, banishment
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The Court backed away from the unadministrability of categorical rules, but the
cumulative effect of the past twenty years of regulatory takings jurisprudence
cautions local governments. The decision still serves the practical purpose of
signaling the theoretical limit to governmental action. It warns government that
regulations should not be permanent when they can be made temporary. While
this suggests that the government need only put an expiration or sunset date on
a regulation to remove it from Lucas's purview, it still lays out a theoretical limit
that puts government on notice of situations in which governmentaljustifications
will be irrelevant, average reciprocity of advantage arguments will be unavailing,
and the impact on the property owners will trump the public interest.
Also, the categorical rules still lurk, perhaps not to be reinstated in their full
form, but still threatening enough to be partially resurrected if the local
government's actions shock the conscience of the property-rights-minded
judge. 310 Therefore, local governments are on notice to proceed carefully in
managing suburban development and should consider compensating in advance,
whenever possible, or providing a quid pro quo to forestall the next unpredictable
set of takings arguments.

ill. CRITICAL ANTI-SUBORDINATION LESSONS FOR THE
WELL-CONSIDERED PLAN: TOWARD A MEANINGFUL STANDARD
Acknowledging the underlying reality of regulatory takings, antisubordination concerns serve two purposes. First, they focus attention on harms
that may not be directly cognizable under traditional Equal Protection or Due
Process doctrine. Second, and more importantly, they allow a move past the
strictures of property rights language typically used to challenge exercises of
eminent domain. This expands the eminent domain discussion to acknowledge
the complexity of interests at play in disagreements over development. The
context for redevelopment suggests that globalization is driving the subordination
inherent in redevelopment as well as simultaneously strengthening the need for
local economic development. 31l As Margit Mayer observes, cities are trying to
remake themselves to keep up with international competition; the higher up they
are in the chain of global cities, the more imperative it is that they provide
advanced services and the more intense the restructuring of urban space. 312
"Local political actors everywhere emphasize economic innovation, seek

to the margins of regulatory takings jurisprudence as mere land exactions that wreak
unconstitutional conditions. The banishment cannot negate the implied recognition of inequality
of bargaining power as a motivation for this doctrinal detour. Moreover, it fully supports the
Court's loud signal to local governments about a categorical definition of unfairness that they
should take care to avoid. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 n.6 (1994).
310. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-16 (discussing the categorical rule of compensating
for regulatory takings).
311. See supra Part I.A-B.
312. Margit Mayer, Urban Social Movements in an Era of Globalisation, in URBAN
MOVEMENTS IN A GlOBAUSING WORm 141, 143 (Pierre Hamel et al. eds., 2000).
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entrepreneurial culture, and implement labour market flexibility in order to
counter the crisis of Fordism and to meet intensified international competition.
Other policy areas are increasingly subordinated to these economic priorities."313
Thus, the globalization imperative is real. But this imperative also structures
redevelopment in a way that certain types of people who live in certain types of
places are left without a voice and without recourse in redevelopment. This
expanded vision of regulatory takings doctrine here invites us to see those
individuals, subordinated by redevelopment, as having a property-like interest in
not being denied their effective voice in the fate of their homes, small businesses,
and desire to live in their community. Regulatory takings doctrine illustrates that
the Court is willing to respond to a perceived subordination in the suburban
context The language of property rights is individualistic, categorical,
inadequate to the task of community, and ambiguous about the rights and
interests harmed by redevelopment. A new conception of the harms and interests
at stake is necessary to acknowledge how community interests should be
considered. Once we drop the blinders obscuring property rights, it will be
possible to see how regulatory takings anti-subordination underpinnings
recognize that property is constitutive of identity and that local governments are
attempting to create a new identity for their cities.314 The categorical approach
of declaring some takings invalid because they involve "economic development"
while retaining the blight exception would still leave the very same
neighborhoods subordinated by redevelopment disproportionately affected.
These neighborhoods would continue to be burdened by a privatized public
decision-making process that is properly characterized as a political process
failure.
Land use and eminent domain doctrine invests local government with the
power to determine or resolve the outcomes of these conflicting interests by
investing government with the sole power or title of community. This sovereign
view of government looks only to the formal powers of government and the
content of these laws, but barely looks to the execution of these powers. 315 One
approach might be to suggest local community institutions that would better
represent community interests in the redevelopment decision-making process.
The difficulty is that there is no unitary community; instead, there are cleavages
in interests that lead to conflict when brought together. 316 Forming new local
institutions is not the answer because this only results in more fragmentation.
According to Crowley, "[P]luralists tend to overlook the structural imbalance in
organizational capacity between elites who set agendas and other stakeholders

313. /d. (citing POST FORDISM: A READER (Ash Amin ed., 1994)).
314. See generally Elizabeth Blackmar, Appropriating "the Commons": The Tragedy of
Property Rights Discourse, in THE POUTICS OF PUBUC SPACE 49 (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds.,
2006).
315. But see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (per curiam)
(permitting a plaintiff "class of one" to bring an equal protection claim against the village in regards
to an easement the City demanded from the plaintiff).
316. CROWlEY, supra note 183, at 18-19.
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wishing to challenge those agendas."317
Thus, Crowley recommends
"[c ]ontentious collective action [a]s an alternative mode of participation for areas
lacking regular access to government officials."318 It is helpful, then, to focus on
two structural variables: 1) the "structure of political opportunities"319 (the threat
of disruption), and 2) "mobilizing structures.,,320 These suggestions refer to both
material, as well as social and structural, resources. Crowley also notes that
"[n]ational and local federated organizations have been decisive in the outcomes
of contention because of their independence from" what has been referred to as
the pro-growth coalition. 321 "Community organizations that depend heavily upon
urban growth coalitions for operating resources are not likely to take the lead in
challenging unwanted growth and redevelopment agendas because they might
risk alienating their supporters and losing access to valuable resources."322
Another key issue facing community institutions is the problem of
informality in the redevelopment process. So many aspects of transactions are
negotiated behind closed doors and are based on interpersonal relations. As
Patience Crowder observes, the need for informality in deal-making is in
potentially irresolvable tension with the public's need for transparency and
information. 323 This reinforces the reality that there is a political process failure
in redevelopment. The lesson of critical race theory is that the Court must gently
steer this political process by sending a substantive message of fairness and
reasonableness countering subordination in redevelopment. This is accomplished
by establishing substantive standards of inclusion that cities must adhere to in
legislating and executing redevelopment projects.
In certain respects, the Court began to make this "political" intervention in
eminent domain doctrine by conditioning the validity of the exercise of eminent
domain on a well-considered development plan. With the well-considered plan
offered as safeguard, it only makes sense to define standards for what is "wellconsidered." This is similar to the results of the means-ends connections

317. Id.atI2.
318. Id. at 17.
319. Id. at 20 (quoting Peter K. Eisenger, The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American
Cities, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 11-25 (1973)).
320. See Doug McAdam et al., Introduction, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 2-4 (McAdam et al. eds., 1996).
321. CROWLEY, supra note 183, at 22.
322. Id. Crowley elaborates on "mobilizing structures" noting,
The phrase "mobilizing structures" refers to resources that challengers can access and
convert into vehicles for mounting and sustaining collective actions. Examples ...
include money, communications media, and meeting places, but also social structures
such as family units, friendship networks, voluntary groups, work units, businesses,
professional organizations, and government agencies that can facilitate resource
mobilization.
Id.
323. See Crowder, supra note 182, at 658 ("Informality in redevelopment clouds transparency
and prevents the achievement of [the] public policy [of getting information to the public].").
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required in Nollan and Dolan; the connection between a regulation's means and
ends must now be justified with expert studies to provide factual support for the
regulation. In the context of the "well-considered" plan, however, instead of
using the means-ends match standard, the Court should actually focus on defining
the "ends." Here, "well-considered" should be backed by bringing to the table
the stakeholders and visionaries of urban living. We are facing enormous
decisions about the future of our cities, and cities are unduly influenced by
upscale private structural pressures of globalization, narrow-mindedness, copycat
approaches, and investment pressures for quick returns. Ratifying plans created
under this globalized context as "well-considered" without defining standards
results in a political choice that favors the status quo. It also ratifies the worst of
what is seriously wrong with current local economic development practices.
The difficult issue is that local governments seem to need no prompting to
seek out informal relations with business elites. Thus, how can we systematically
encourage local government to reach out to others in the community? What legal
carrots-and-sticks can one provide to make it in their interest to seek out
community? A starting point is to define substantive anti-subordination
standards for the "well-considered" plan. The plans underlying eminent domain
can reflect gut-felt fairness principles of inclusion and responsiveness to
community perspectives. More specifically, this will require participatory
institutional structures that provide training and resources to enable citizen
participation in plan formulation. 324
This lengthy discussion on regulatory takings suggests an argument for a
heightened standard of review. But actually, as much I would like to develop
such an argument, I have not seen, nor have I been able to come up with, a
principled basis upon which to draw the line between proper and improper
purposes. Proponents of a closer means-ends match usually throw a doctrinal
wrench in the development process that may not be proportionate to the
particular harm or impact of the redevelopment. 325 The convergence of critical
race theory and regulatory takings anti-subordination concerns looks to the
context of a government decision and acknowledges the defects in the political
process that hamper individual property owners or residents of certain types of

324. See generally JAMES L. CREIGHrON, THE PUBliC PARTICIPATION HANDBOOK: MAKING
BEITER DECISIONS THROUGH CITIZEN lNvOLVEMENT (2005). Creighton notes, 'This book shows
how to design and conduct a public participation from beginning to end." [d. at 5. For additional
resources on citizen participation, see HENRY SANOFF, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION METHODS IN
DESIGN AND PLANNING 6 (2000) (describing Nos Quedamos involvement ofimpoverished residents
in urban renewal at Melrose Commons); Emil E. Malizia, Structuring Urban Redevelopment
Projects: Moving Participants up the Learning Curve, 25 J. REALEsT. REs. 463, 473-76 (2003)
(providing ideas for attempting to communicate lenders' expectations to community).
325. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 934, 969 (2003) (arguing for a reasonable necessity standard of review for the
public-use clause to demand factual justification for land transfers and require the government to
justify how it chooses to acquire property).
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communities from protecting their interests. 326 What regulatory takings doctrine
provides is the example of specific expressions of judicial guidance on a roadmap
of concerns that local government must consider. Critical race theory provides
an explicit, unapologetic acknowledgment that these disagreements about
development are political. Thus, perhaps the fix to what is so unsatisfying about
the Kelo majority opinion comes from focusing on the politics of the
redevelopment process and providing a hopefully ameliorating antidote to the
current state of political process failure. 327 As John Hart Ely observes:
The Constitution has instead proceeded from the quite sensible
assumption that an effective majority will not inordinately threaten its
own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not
systematically treat others less well than it treats itself-by structuring
decision processes at all levels to try to ensure, first, that everyone's
interests will be ... represented ... at the point of substantive decision,
and second, that the . . . application will not be manipulated so as to
reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in
theory.328

326. The divergences are also potentially, although not necessarily, quite clear. For example,
it might seem that regulatory takings is solely concerned with property owners. Justice Thomas's
unique expression of concern for the systematic disadvantages to certain communities, for instance,
arises because he can see disadvantage (racial and class) as it affects the property owner. See supra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text. Yet, other types of residents, namely tenants, can also be
included under the regulatory takings umbrella because strong protections of property rights
necessarily involve "conceptual severance." See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of
Property: Cross-Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988)
(discussing conceptual severance). Tenants are the owners of strands of property rights. Thus,
tenants should be protectible under the regulatory takings property rights umbrella as well.
327. For other approaches to the role of the political process in redevelopment, see Brief for
the American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kelo v. City
ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166929, at *25-26 ("Another source
of protection for all property owners is to assure, to the extent possible, that eminent domain is
exercised only in conjunction with a process of land use planning that includes broad public
participation and a careful consideration of alternatives to eminent domain."); Paul Boudreaux,
Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENY.
U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2005) (proposing "eminent domain be constitutionally impermissible when it is
both used to take land destined for private hands and disproportionately hurts the poor or politically
disadvantaged"); Elisabeth Sperow, The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, Not Legislation,
Is the Cure, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 405, 426-27 (2007) (discussing participation in the political
process and negotiation with politicians as the appropriate response to Kelo); see generally Joseph
William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just
Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 309 (2006) (advocating a citizenship model of property
rights to create a fairness-based framework for analyzing regulatory takings).
328. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100-01
(1980).
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That political process is currently subsumed within the carefully considered
redevelopment plan that Kelo says will ratify an exercise of eminent domain. 329
As currently formulated, the Court affirmed a top-down planning process
developed by the state. 330 The reality is that within the field of urban planning,
a plan has legitimacy not because of authority granted from the state and the
convening or several meetings to merely inform residents. 331 For example, an
international organization, the International Association for Public Participation
(IAP2), has developed core values for public participation.332
The planning process involves certain inclusive procedural components. It
is supposed to directly involve residents in articulating the needs for the area and
envisioning future development, thereby receiving an opportunity to ensure that
their needs are met by the resulting development. 333 Concededly, this last point
means both a procedural component to planning as well as a substantive

329. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
330. See generally id.
331. See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use, 34 ECOLOGYL.Q. 443, 46168 (2007) (arguing that land use planning is inadequate to limit pretextual takings or lead to more
successful projects).
332. The IAP2 website states:
As an international leader in public participation, IAP2 has developed the "IAP2 Core
Values for Public Participation" for use in the development and implementation of
public participation processes. These core values were developed over a two-year
period with broad international input to identify those aspects of public participation
which cross national, cultural, and religious boundaries. The purpose of these core
values is to help make better decisions which reflect the interests and concerns of
potentially affected people and entities.
International Association for Public Participation, IAP2 Core Values, http://www.iap2.orgl
displaycommon.cfm?an=4 (last visited Mar. 12,2009).
333. See id. "IAP2 Core Values for the Practice of Public Participation:
1. Public participation is based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision
have a right to be involved in the decision-making process.
2. Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution will
influence the decision.
3. Public participation promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and
communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decisionmakers.
4. Public participation seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those potentially
affected by or interested in a decision.
5. Public participation seeks input from participants in designing how they
participate.
6. Public participation provides participants with the information they need to
participate in a meaningful way.
7. Public participation communicates to participants how their input affected the
decision.
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component; it suggests that a plan involving the residents that is carefully
considered will yield a substantive result that ensures that their needs are
considered in the plan. Thus, it is not possible to avoid some normative view of
the proper substance of a redevelopment plan when competing needs are so great.
On the other hand, the appeal of strengthening the carefully considered plan is
limited-the disadvantages to existing residents in the political process are still
present. Yet, Professor Ann Carlson and Daniel Pollak's study has shown in the
regulatory takings setting that the doctrine, even with its pro-government
deferential standard, has impacted the way that local government officials make
land use decisions. 334 Similarly, it would probably take very little for the
Supreme Court to impact eminent domain redevelopment decisionmaking by
clarifying the standard for what a carefully considered plan by rights should look
like.
The state of the planning literature today suggests that planning both is and
is not the answer.335 The planning field is in flux. It has promised too much, and
its practitioners and theorists are never politically placed to have a very
significant role in actual planning. They have been either brought in as
procedural facilitators or advocates, but not as part of imagining what will
actually take place. Thus, just as the problem of redevelopment is complex, the
solutions are equally complex. The role of the Supreme Court is to remedy the
political process failure and not place a finger on the balance of a political
process that is unduly weighted in favor of the types of redevelopment we see. 336
We cannot assume that in this arena, however, the States are making the best
decisions. The disaster of urban renewal proves as much. In addition, the
Supreme Court cannot substitute its judgment for what is a good project. To the
extent, however, that the Court conditions eminent domain on a carefully
considered plan-the plan that is truly well-considered in fact, not just
theory---can be easily infused with some broad but substantive teeth.
Specifically, the Court could require that the plan endorse actual planning and
inclusion in the process and the substance of the outcome. This point echoes the
Kelo dissents trying to use public ownership or public access as the measure;
instead, I focus on process because it allows greater flexibility and more directly
acknowledges its political nature. The lessons of regulatory takings doctrine are
that the Supreme Court should intervene in defining standards where there is
political process failure due to unequal bargaining power. Conceptual severance

334. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 16, at 116-17.
335. See Robert Fishman, The Fifth Migration, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N, 357, 358 (2005)
(arguing that the United States is in the early stages of another great "migration" of population
identified by Lewis Mumford in a classic 1925 article as largely shaping America).
336. Peter Marcuse, The Politics of Public Space; The Right to the City: Social Justice and
the Fight for Public Space, 73.1 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N 125 (2007) (reviewing both THE POUTICS
OF PUBUC SPACE (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 2006) and DON MITCHElL, THE RIGlIT TO THE
CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGlIT fUR PUBuc SPACE (2003» ("Public space can be used to
limit democracy as well as further it. And Harvey links the use of public space to discussions of
the right to the city.").
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allows the cognizance of different types of property owners-residential and
commercial, owners and renters.
CONCLUSION

Not all property owners are wealthy and politically powerful. Not all of the
poor are without political power or social capital. Nevertheless, it is the case that
in the redevelopment context, the nature of the development imperatives,
described at length above, work to the exclusion of the existing residents through
privatized decision-making processes that ironically are used to justify the
"publicness" of the redevelopment plan. The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo
is understandable for its reluctance to intervene in legislative decisionmaking
about valid and invalid purposes. The decision has the inadvertent effect,
however, of placing a hand on the balance of urban redevelopment, to the
unacknowledged detriment of residents, property owners, and small business
people. In light of the ever-increasing imperatives towards economic
development from globalization-with cities viewing their interests as
consistently aligned with national developers, corporations, and retailers-the
consistent winners and losers in that redevelopment game should not be ignored.
We cannot presume that because development is state-sponsored the interests of
the public or of the residents of the proposed redevelopment will be appropriately
considered. Both regulatory takings and critical race theory provide the language
and the logic of anti-subordination provides a way to acknowledge the
subordination. The Court has a responsibility to ensure that the eminent domain
doctrine encourages a meaningful process and substantive standards that secures
the interests of all who are present and subjected to a proposed redevelopment
scheme.

